I am not sure if this question is appropriate for MO, since I have only a basic understanding of Boolean logic, and am maybe not qualified to ask questions beyond that, but still I will try to write what I have in mind:
In everyday logic, we emphasize the perspective / point of view of someone who is trying to convince someone else with "his logic".
I tried to take this literally to marry vectors in some Hilbert space with Luwaksiewiecz logic in a short unpolished essay (or a recent version) which answers some questions that it raises:
The ideas here are to first start with a set of things and a positive semidefinite kernel on these things. The theory of RKHS / Moore-Aaronszajn theorem, gives us a Hilbert space $H$ where $k(x,y) = \left < \phi(x), \phi(y)\right>$ where $\phi: X \rightarrow H$ is an injective function, called 'feature mapping' in machine learning. Now suddenly we can do geometry on this set abstract set of things $X$. The conclusion of machine learning community is, that a 'feature vector' $\phi(x)$ of $x$ captures the 'semantic of the element $x$' relative to $k$.
Taking the perspective of everyday logic, we might want be able to give a semantic meaning to the phrase 'different point of views'. But this is very easy done in geometry, since if $x$ takes the perspective of $w$, then we might want to project the unit vector $\phi(x)$ to the unit vector $\phi(w)$, to get:
\begin{equation} \label{eq:pi_w} \pi_w(x) = \frac{k(w,x)}{|w|^2}w = k(w,x)w \end{equation}
For this last equation, we write:
\begin{equation} \label{eq:relative_to_w} x \text{ (relative to } w) := \pi_w(x) = k(w,x)w \end{equation}
and
\begin{equation} \label{eq:length_x_w} |x|_w := |\pi_w(x)| \end{equation}
which is the length of the projected vector.
Now we can imagine what the meaning of 'I have a different perspective' means. We simply associate the projection of the semantic vector of $x$ to some other perspective vector $w$. Then 'changing perspective' simply means to change the perspective vector from $w$ to say $\hat{w}$.
Let us define
\begin{equation} \label{eq:land_relative_to_w} x \land y \text{ (relative to } w) := \min(k(w,x),k(w,y)) \phi(w) \end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:lor_relative_to_w} x \lor y \text{ (relative to } w) := \max(k(w,x),k(w,y)) \phi(w) \end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:not_x} \lnot x := - \pi_w(x) \end{equation}
and following Lukasiewicz:
\begin{equation} \label{eq:implies_relative_to_w} x \rightarrow y \text{ (relative to } w) := \min(1,1+|y|_w-|x|_w) w \end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:equvi} x \leftrightarrow y \text{ (relative to } w) := x \equiv y := (x \rightarrow y) \land (y \rightarrow x) \end{equation}
We have the de Morgan rules, double negation, contraposition:
\begin{equation} \label{eq:de_morgan_1} (\lnot x) \land (\lnot y) = \lnot ( x \lor y ) \text{ (relative to } w) \end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:de_morgan_2} (\lnot x) \lor (\lnot y) = \lnot ( x \land y ) \text{ (relative to } w) \end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:double_neg} (\lnot (\lnot x)) = x \text{ (relative to w)} \end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:contraposition} (x \rightarrow y ) = ((\lnot y) \rightarrow (\lnot x)) \text{ (relative to w)} \end{equation}
Let us define three cases of truth values: $T,F,I$ which should be translated to True, False, Indeterminate.
\begin{equation} \label{eq:truth} \mu(x) = \begin{cases} T & \text{if } k(w,x) < 0, \\ I & \text{if } k(w,x) = 0, \\ F & \text{if } k(w,x) > 0. \end{cases} \end{equation}
We have a version of 'Modus ponens':
\begin{equation} \label{eq:mp} \text{ If } \mu(x)=T \text{ and } \mu( x \rightarrow y ) = T \text{ then } \mu( (x \land ( x \rightarrow y)) \rightarrow y) ) = T \end{equation}
The Liar Paradox in Semantic Spaces
The Liar Paradox is a classic illustration of self-reference and inconsistency in logic, often summarized by the statement, "This statement is false." If we assume the statement is true, then it must be false as it claims. Conversely, if we assume it is false, then it would paradoxically be true. This paradox highlights the difficulties in dealing with self-referential statements in formal systems. It is well-known that using multi-valued logic, one can give the statement "This statement is false" an indeterminate logical value, different from true or false. Here, we aim to illustrate that it is possible to find a framework where both the classical paradox and the new interpretation are logically possible by altering the perspective.
To illustrate how semantic perspectives can resolve or interpret this paradox differently, let us consider an example involving vectors.
We will be interpreting the Liar Paradox like this: We are searching for a sentence—or better yet, let us call it formula $ L $—whose negation $ \lnot L $ is equal to $ L $: $$ \lnot L = L $$
The basic idea is to change the perspective or point of view $ w $, so that the truth value or even the formula itself satisfies: $$ \lnot L = L \quad \text{(first interpretation)} $$ or in terms of truth values $$ \mu(\lnot L) = \mu(L) \quad \text{(second interpretation)} $$
Let $ X := \{ e_1, -e_1, e_2, -e_2 \} $, where $ e_1 = (0, 1) $, $ e_2 = (1, 0)$ are standard basis vectors in $\mathbb{R}^2$ with the usual inner product. We choose $ L = (0, 1) = e_1 $ and $ w = (1, 0) = e_2 $. With this choice, the negation of $ L $ relative to $ w $, denoted $ \lnot L \operatorname{rel} w $, is given by $ -L \operatorname{rel} w $. With this choice, $ w $ is perpendicular to $ L $ and $ -L $, hence this perspective might be suitable for "resolving" the paradox, as it is not in the same subspace spanned by $ L $ and $ -L $.
We compute: $$ k(w, L) = 0 \implies \mu(L \operatorname{rel} w) = I $$ and also $$ k(w, \lnot L) = -k(w, L) = 0 \implies \mu(\lnot L \operatorname{rel} w) = I $$ Hence $$ L \operatorname{rel} w = \pi_w(L) = k(w, L)\phi(w) = 0 = -k(w, L)\phi(w) = k(w, \lnot L)\phi(w) = \pi_w(\lnot L) = (\lnot L) \operatorname{rel} w $$ and the first interpretation of the Liar Paradox is satisfied, and also $$ \mu(L \operatorname{rel} w) = I = \mu(\lnot L \operatorname{rel} w) $$ so the second interpretation of the Liar Paradox is also satisfied.
If we change the perspective $ w $ to $ w := L = (0, 1) $ or $ w := -L = (0, -1) $, then in the first case we get: $$ k(w, L) = 1 \implies k(w, -L) = -1 \implies \mu(L \operatorname{rel} w) = T \neq F = \mu(\lnot L \operatorname{rel} w) $$ hence the second interpretation of the Liar Paradox cannot be satisfied, and consequently, the first interpretation also cannot be satisfied.
In the case of $ w := -L $, we again find that the Liar Paradox cannot be satisfied: $$ k(w, L) = -1 \implies k(w, -L) = 1 \implies \mu(L \operatorname{rel} w) = F \neq T = \mu(\lnot L \operatorname{rel} w) $$
Comment:
It appears that different logical meanings can be attributed to the Liar Paradox through a change in perspective. If one insists that the perspective must lie within the subspace generated by $ L $ and $ -L $, then the Liar Paradox cannot be satisfied, as shown above. However, if one allows a perspective perpendicular to the subspace generated by $ L $ and $ -L $, then the Liar Paradox can be satisfied in some sense. This is analogous to a common situation in mathematics: while some equations may not be solvable in a certain set or mathematical structure (such as a ring or field), they can be solved in a larger space that encompasses the original set as a substructure. For example, $ x^2 = -1 $ is not solvable in $ \mathbb{R} $, but it is solvable in $ \mathbb{C} $, which contains $ \mathbb{R} $.
I could not find something similar for reference in Google so I am asking here, if this point of view has been explored in the literature before?
Thanks for your help!