8
$\begingroup$

$N \geq 2$ players play a cooperative game on the integers $\mathbb Z$. All of them start from $0$. At each turn, they are simultanously given the same yes or no question to answer. The questions given are in fact randomly generated gibberish, whose truth values are determined by flipping independent, fair coins. Nevertheless, all players who answer correctly move forward a step, while the ones who answer wrong move backward a step.

Their goal is to minimise the expected time it takes for at least one of them to get to some fixed endpoint $K \in \mathbb Z_+$.

Question: What can be said about an optimal strategy, and the minimal expected time taken, given that the players are aware of where each other are at each stage?

$\endgroup$
5
  • $\begingroup$ You mean they all play at each turn, answering the same question, and those players answering correctly move forward a step, the others backward? $\endgroup$ Commented Jul 28 at 12:56
  • $\begingroup$ 1 and 2 are effectively the same, unless by 2 you mean that the players can't see their own position either - if the players can see their own movement, they can infer what the correct answer was, and therefore also how all the other players moved (assuming their strategy is deterministic, but I don't think a random strategy helps). $\endgroup$
    – paste bee
    Commented Jul 28 at 13:18
  • $\begingroup$ @pastebee Oh you are right, then forget the second scenario. Will edit to reflect this. $\endgroup$
    – Nate River
    Commented Jul 28 at 13:30
  • $\begingroup$ @ClaudeChaunier Indeed. $\endgroup$
    – Nate River
    Commented Jul 28 at 13:31
  • 5
    $\begingroup$ @user479223 The players can coordinate. For instance when $N = 2^K$, if each player gives a different sequence of answers, it is guaranteed that exactly one of them will get every question right, and so this strategy wins in $K$ steps, which is the best possible result. The important aspect is that the correct answer is the same for each player, and so strategies can look like "have this group of players all move in the same direction". $\endgroup$
    – paste bee
    Commented Jul 28 at 14:20

1 Answer 1

1
$\begingroup$

For $N = 2$, I think the (likely obvious) strategy of "always guess different" is optimal, giving expected hitting time $K^2$. I think we can show this using dynamic programming using the potential function (edit: added simpler equivalent expression) $$\begin{aligned} \Phi(x_1, x_2) &= (K - x_1)(K - x_2) \\ &= \biggl(K - \frac{x_1 + x_2}{2}\biggr)^2 - \biggl(\frac{x_1 - x_2}{2}\biggr)^2. \end{aligned}$$ However, I'm neglecting details to do with unboundedness of the state space. Posting what I have in case someone can add the missing piece, or in case the intuition helps when extending to $N \geq 3$.

We satisfy the necessary boundary condition: $\Phi(K, x_2) = \Phi(x_1, K) = 0$. If the state space were bounded, it would suffice to show we satisfy the Bellman equation when $\max\{x_1, x_2\} < K$. (The state space is unbounded, but let's keep going anyway.)

Let $R \sim \operatorname{Rademacher}$ (i.e. a $\pm 1$ coin flip). The expected change in $\Phi$ under each action is $$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\text{different}} \Phi(x_1, x_2) &:= \mathbb{E}[\Phi(x_1 + R, x_2 - R) - \Phi(x_1, x_2)] = -1, \\ \Delta_{\text{same}} \Phi(x_1, x_2) &:= \mathbb{E}[\Phi(x_1 + R, x_2 + R) - \Phi(x_1, x_2)] = +1. \end{aligned}$$ (One way to do these computations easily is to notice that "different" changes the difference $x_1 - x_2$ by $\pm 2$ while keeping the sum $x_1 + x_2$ the same, and vice versa for "same".)

Because each step incurs cost $1$, the Bellman equation we hope to satisfy is $$ \min\{\Delta_{\text{different}} \Phi(x_1, x_2), \Delta_{\text{same}} \Phi(x_1, x_2)\} = -1, $$ with the minimizing operator corresponding to the optimal action. And indeed, this holds, and "different" is always the optimal action.

$\endgroup$

You must log in to answer this question.

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged .