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We work in $\mathsf{ZFC+V=L}$.


Define a plausible theory to be a theory $T\subseteq\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1,\omega}$ in an $\omega_1$-finite language which is $\omega_1$-c.e. and $\omega_1$-finitely satisfiable; that is, $T$ is a theory in a countable language which is $\Sigma_1$-definable over $L_{\omega_1}$ (with parameters) and every countable subtheory of $T$ is satisfiable.

Since $L_{\omega_1}$ is uncountable, Barwise compactness does not apply and plausible theories need not be satisfiable. That said, every plausible theory is "generically" satisfiable: they all become satisfiable after forcing with $\mathit{Col}(\omega,\omega_1)$, since in the generic extension we can apply Barwise compactness.

I'm interested in measuring the difficulty of "satisfiabilizing" a plausible theory via forcing. Specifically, set $T_0\trianglelefteq T_1$ iff $T_0$ is satisfiable in every generic extension in which $T_1$ is satisfiable. (Note that by absoluteness of $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1,\omega}$-semantics we don't have to worry about theories becoming unsatisfiable.) As usual, this preorder induces an equivalence relation $\approx$ and a corresponding poset $\mathcal{Plaus}$ of plausibility degrees.

I'm generally interested in the "shape" of $\mathcal{Plaus}$, but in particular the following question seems particularly natural:

Question. Does $\mathcal{Plaus}$ have coatoms?

(See below for a proof that $\mathcal{Plaus}$ does have a top element.) I strongly suspect that the answer is negative, but I don't see how to prove that.


Very briefly, here's what I already know. $\mathcal{Plaus}$ is a bounded lattice: ${\bf 0}$ = "already satisfiable," ${\bf 1}$ = "requires $\omega_1^L<\omega_1$," $S\sqcup T$ = "disjoint union of models," and $S\sqcap T=\{\sigma\vee\tau:\sigma\in S,\tau\in T\}$. In fact $\mathcal{Plaus}$ is countably complete, by the obvious extensions of those operations. Moreover, ${\bf 0}$ is not the meet of countably many nonzero elements (observed by Farmer S.), and has a unique atom (there is a plausible theory which becomes satisfiable exactly when we add a non-constructible subset of $\omega_1^L$, which has to happen when any unsatisfiable plausible theory is made satisfiable). Finally, $\mathcal{Plaus}$ is not linear and has $\omega_1$-many degrees; these facts follow from some easy-but-tedious forcing arguments, whose details I'm happy to add if anyone's interested. I believe these same arguments can be used to show that ${\bf 1}$ is not a nontrivial finite join (and so $\mathcal{Plaus}$ has at most one coatom), but that's a bit messier.

Unfortunately, none of this seems particularly relevant to the coatom question (except the existence of $\mathbf 1$ which is needed to pose it in the first place).

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  • $\begingroup$ Separately it's worth noting that making an originally-unsatisfiable theory become satisfiable is really the only impact forcing can have here: by absoluteness of $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1,\omega}$-satisfaction we can never make a satisfiable theory unsatisfiable, and by downward Lowenheim-Skolem for individual $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1,\omega}$-sentences + Mostowski absoluteness we can never make an unsatisfiable countable theory satisfiable. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 4, 2021 at 22:12
  • $\begingroup$ Furthermore, $\Sigma_1(L_{\omega_1})$-ness is absolute in both directions, so the set of plausible theories doesn't change when we force. This means that each generic extension $L[G]$ yields a corresponding quotient of $\mathcal{Plaus}$ where we replace "generic extension of $L$" by "generic extension of $L[G]$." "Forcing quotients" of $\mathcal{Plaus}$ might be a useful thing to think about along the way to an answer to the specific question above. But this is all just guesswork. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 4, 2021 at 22:14
  • $\begingroup$ I always get nervous about links that don't announce their target, since Elsevier likes to shuffle their organisation. "Barwise compactness" points to the eponymous chapter, namely Chapter 9, of Model theory for infinitary logic, edited by Keisler. $\endgroup$
    – LSpice
    Commented Apr 4, 2021 at 22:48
  • $\begingroup$ What does "sufficiently (Sacks) generic" mean? $\endgroup$
    – Farmer S
    Commented Jun 9, 2021 at 20:17
  • $\begingroup$ @FarmerS Meeting some "large" but still countable set of dense subsets for the relevant forcing. E.g. the notions of $n$-generic (for Cohen forcing) in computability theory. A lot of the time we don't need full set-theoretic genericity. $\endgroup$ Commented Jun 9, 2021 at 20:19

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