$N$-player discounted stochastic games with finite state and action spaces possess a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies. This has been proved by Fink (1964) and a closely related result by Takahashi (1964). Various generalizations have appeared since then.
I have read Fink's proof and understood it (at least I think so). To prove equilibrium, he must compare his proposed strategy to all other possible strategies. However it seems to me that he only considers the set of stationary strategies.
I can see one reason that looking only at stationary strategies is sufficient. Namely, if every other player uses a stationary strategy (this is the candidate Nash equilibrium), then the $n$-th player must solve a Markov Decision problem and it has been proved (e.g., look at Puterman's or Derman's books) that for the MDP nothing is lost by using a stationary strategy.
However, I have looked and have not been able to find some work in which the above or some other argument is used to justify considering only stationary strategies for the $N$-player case.
So my question is this: do you know of any work that addresses the above concerns? Any help will be greatly appreciated.