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Let $\mathcal C$ be an $\infty$-category. We can ask:

Q: Is $\mathcal C$ a 1-category?

That is, are the hom-spaces of $\mathcal C$ essentially discrete?

Roughly, my question is:

Proto-Question: Is Q decidable?

Presumably the answer is going to depend a lot on how we make Q precise. I am not a computability theorist, so I’m not sure what is the best way to approach making it precise.


First pass: We might encode $\mathcal C$ as a quasi-category — a simplicial set satisfying certain “lifting conditions”. We might assume for simplicity that $\mathcal C$ has countably many simplices, and assume we are given an algorithm which enumerates a list of names for the $n$-dimensional simplices of $\mathcal C$ for each $n \in \mathbb N$, and an algorithm which computes the face and degeneracy maps between them. It then appears to be a well-posed question to ask: is $\mathcal C$ (presented in this way) a 1-category?

Answer: Clearly (and uninterestingly) no -- for instance let $\mathcal C$ have two objects $a,b$, with $Hom(a,a) = \{id_a\}$, $Hom(b,b) = \{id_b\}$, $Hom(b,a) = \emptyset$, and $Hom(a,b) = BG$ where $G$ is a group defined by a presentation for which it’s undecidable if $G$ is trivial. Then we can’t decide whether $\mathcal C$ is a 1-category, since that would mean deciding whether $BG$ is contractible, which would mean deciding whether $G$ is trivial.


Question: Is there a reasonable way to “precisify” the Proto-Question into a precise question with an interesting answer? Are there many such ways? If so, are the answers in each case fundamnetally similar? Or is the answer fundamentally dependent on the precisification?


My guess would be that basically, in order to turn the proto-question into something with an interesting answer, you need to drastically restrict the class of $\infty$-categories $\mathcal C$ under consideration, to the point where you can build up a theory tailored to your set of restrictions. At any rate, I believe this is how things work in group theory or number theory or manifold theory — once the central decision problem of the field is shown to be undecidable, we really must give up on the idea of “general” approaches to the decision problem, and instead explore one class of special cases after another, each with a different set of tools that resist generalizatoin. My sense is that this is a universal fact about undecidable problems — they cannot be approximated by decidable ones.

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    $\begingroup$ I think it's going to be difficult to precisify the question in a way that it doesn't have a negative answer for 'dumb' reasons. If you have any computable mapping of codes in $\mathbb{N}$ to $\infty$-categories and I'm allowed to take coproducts of families indexed by c.e. sets of codes, then the problem with be undecidable unless all of the coded $\infty$-categories are strict. (I don't even need any relatively hard results like the undecidability of the word problem to do this.) $\endgroup$ Commented Jul 10 at 3:39
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    $\begingroup$ Basically I would say that the intuition you get when you learn computable structure theory is that properties of a structure are only going to be decidable if they're somehow fixed by a 'finite amount of data'. Even something as benign as whether a $\mathbb{Q}$-vector space is $1$-dimensional or not isn't decidable from a computable presentation of it. $\endgroup$ Commented Jul 10 at 3:46
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    $\begingroup$ I would expect that even for finitely presented infinity categories this will not be decidable (as a special case of the same statement for finitely presented 2-groups). $\endgroup$
    – aws
    Commented Jul 10 at 14:46

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