Essential undecidability of PA says every complete extension of PA includes a non r.e. set of new "axioms," all undecidable in PA. In that sense lots of sentences of PA are undecidable in PA. And it is trivial to design a measure on, say sentences of PA with Godel number below $n$, where the set of decidable sentences has measure 1 (for all $n$ above the Godel number of the first decidable sentence, which would be 0=0 for the usual Godel numberings). Just take the counting measure while restricting the count to decidable sentences. Similar cheap tricks will give other uninformative results.
But is there a useful, nontrivial way to define the density of decidable sentences in PA?
The answer seems to be the state of the art. It has nothing special to do with PA of course. It holds for any incomplete theory, just using any theorem in place of $0=0$ and any refutable sentence in place of $0=1$. Chaitin's "heuristic principle" uses complexity to suggest that in fact almost all true sentences are independent in any recursive extension of PA, as cited in discussion of How many of the true sentences are provable? But people do not seem persuaded by this.