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Large cardinal hypotheses and related hypotheses like projective determinacy are well-known to be gauges of the consistency strength of various theories. What reasons are there to believe in their truth, rather than merely in their consistency, or at most their truth in some transitive model?

Various authors have presented and argued for the more conservative position in the literature. On the other hand, one argument presented for the truth of projective determinacy is the following theorem of Woodin.

Theorem (Woodin). The following are equivalent:
(1) Projective Determinacy (schematically rendered).
(2) For every $n < \omega$, there is a fine-structural, countably iterable inner model $M$ such that $M \models$ “There are $n$ Woodin cardinals”.

However, one can still quarantine projective determinacy and its equivalent above to be true in some model (or transitive model) of ZFC, since models can be talked about within models.

If one quarantines large cardinal axioms to models, then their existence is just a matter of what your background set theory is (as the existence of models and the existence of transitive models depends only on that), rather than a matter of what large cardinals one decides "exist" in some absolute sense. Moreover, this still allows for the use of large cardinals axioms as a gauge for the consistency strengths of other theories and for each other. Thus, my question more precisely is, what reasons are there to believe in the the "truth" of large cardinal axioms, rather than its being a matter of whether or not they are true in some model, or in some transitive model, relative to the background theory one is using?

Edits (additions given some comments):

From Chow--Related posts: Philosophical arguments in defense (or against) large cardinals What "forces" us to accept large cardinal axioms? Philosophical arguments in defense (or against) large cardinals

From Hamkins: As Hamkins points out in his answer, my question is related to the question of whether or not the "instrumentalist dodge" or variants thereof are truly enough to "dodge" large cardinals or not.

FINAL EDIT: Sorry to answer my own question, but I wanted to summarizes the answers of Monroe Eskew and Joel David Hamkins and some of the comments that were provided.

The main argument by those who insist on the truth of LCAs is that their truth is the only explanation of their many consequences, including their consistency (Eskew). In other words, "it is the existence [of] the large cardinals and not merely their consistency [that] presents a coherent picture of mathematical reality, which gives rise to all the other consequences of large cardinals of which we are familiar. The view is that we believe in the consistency assertions because we think that the stronger large cardinals exist. Without that existence, we wouldn't have any reason to believe in even the much weaker consistency assertions" (Hamkins). Steel, in particular, objects to theories merely asserting consistency results as "the intrumentalist dodge." However, we often want to compare consistencies of theories without asserting the theories themselves, so it is not clear that the instrumentalist dodge should be dismissed as "unnatural" as Steel claims it to be. See further objections to Steel's claim in Hamkins' papers, "The set-theoretic multiverse" and "Nonlinearity and illfoundedness in the hierarchy of large cardinal consistency strength." For example, in the former paper, Hamkins notes that "The believer in large cardinals is usually happy to consider those cardinals and other set-theoretic properties inside a transitive model, and surely understanding how a particular set-theoretic concept behaves inside a transitive model of set theory is nearly the same as understanding how it behaves in $V$."

In favor of the existence of large cardinals, note that LCAs that are not too far from 𝖹𝖥𝖢 (like inaccessibles) are accepted by many category theorists in a form of Grothendieck universes; however stronger LCAs require better justification (Eskew). A problem, however, is where, if anywhere, to draw the line: the stronger the LCA, the more likely it is to be inconsistent, and therefore the stronger LCAs are less likely to be accepted by the general mathematical community. However, evidence for "the mutual consistency of the large cardinals" is "their linear ordering in the hierarchy" (Eskew).

For the existence of LCAs in general, "There is an explanation along the lines of, we developed a theoretical framework that can be modified and strengthened in somewhat obvious ways, and this results in a coherent system of hypotheses. We looked at the limits of this framework, and tried to find the exact breaking point" (Eskew). One might ask: Are there any other theoretical frameworks extending ZFC that preclude the existence of nearly all large cardinals? One might be $V = L$, or even the axiom of restriction, but most set theorists dismiss them, as they rule out large large cardinals and inaccessible cardinals, respectively, and instead seek core models that accommodate nearly all large cardinals. (In a vein related to LCAs, there are also various forcing axioms and axioms of determinacy.) One is hard-pressed to find an alternative coherent system of hypotheses that "complete" the axioms of ZFC that preclude the large cardinals besides those, such as the axiom of restriction, that preclude them by fiat.

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    $\begingroup$ Good question. I do not think there is an easy answer to say what being true means. The truth of LCAs has a wide agreement from set theorists, but the truth of the continuum hypothesis is still on (and possibly in an endless) debate. I also have no idea what truth should mean, and it is worthwhile to note that Woodin changed his opinion about the truth of CH. $\endgroup$
    – Hanul Jeon
    Commented Sep 17 at 23:51
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    $\begingroup$ @HanulJeon I believe that there are lots of statements which are consistent but not true. In particular, I definitely believe that there is a "true" universe out there, and I also believe that our exploration of it has not uncovered all essential truths. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 17 at 23:51
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    $\begingroup$ @TheoJohnson-Freyd I do not have a solid opinion about it (although I think large cardinal axioms should be true) and I do not want to make a philosophical discussion on this comment line. I do not disagree with your opinion, though, and various logicians (like Gödel or Woodin) also have a similar stance with you as you may know. $\endgroup$
    – Hanul Jeon
    Commented Sep 17 at 23:55
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    $\begingroup$ @Wojowu For a long time, even after reading Maddy's books on the subject, I really wanted to believe that $V = L$. I have many arguments, as Hamkins does, as to why it is not as limiting an axiom as many believe. Others believe $V \neq L$ because measurable cardinals exist. But aren't both axioms limiting? Why should we believe that measurable cardinals exist, even if we believe strongly that their existence is consistent with ZFC? $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 18 at 0:15
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    $\begingroup$ Jesse, your argument with $V=L$ may be countered by arguments with more sophisticated inner models (like, $L[U]$ for a normal ultrafilter $U$) as it also satisfies most of what $L$ satisfies like diamond principle while it allows a measurable cardinal. $\endgroup$
    – Hanul Jeon
    Commented Sep 18 at 5:46

3 Answers 3

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With regard to the title question, I believe that the main argument people would provide would be that it is the actual existence of the large cardinals that explains the consistency assertions that one might otherwise fall back on. It is the existence the large cardinals and not merely their consistency presents a coherent picture of mathematical reality, which gives rise to all the other consequences of large cardinals of which we are familiar. The view is that we believe in the consistency assertions because we think that the stronger large cardinals exist. Without that existence, we wouldn't have any reason to believe in even the much weaker consistency assertions.

Sharpening this view, Steel calls it the "instrumentalist dodge" to attempt to avoid the stronger hypothesis of actual existence by adopting mere consistency as a way of accommodating consistency strength without the large cardinals themselves. He introduces notions of "natural" theories, by which theories such as ZFC + Con(ZFC+$\exists$inaccessible cardinal) do not fulfill the naturality requirement, but ZFC + the actual large cardinals do. For example, if there is a Mahlo cardinal, then we know that arithmetic consequences of ZFC + inaccessible are actually true, but we wouldn't get this kind of conclusion from mere consistency. The actual existence has such a kind of veracity in its consequences this way.

In this sense, your question is really asking about the instrumentalist dodge — why not fall back on it?

One of the arguments that Steel proposes is that, he claims, it closes off the consideration of views. According to Steel, the large cardinal set-theorist can still consider the nature of V=L set theory, without the stronger large cardinals, simply by relativizing set theory to L. But, he says, there is no translation in the other direction.

These views can be criticized on various grounds, and I do so in my paper on Nonlinearity and illfoundedness in the hierarchy of large cardinal consistency strength.

Meanwhile, my own philosophical position, explained in my paper The set-theoretic multiverse, is to call into question whether there is a coherent singular notion of "truth" that we are talking about here. I question whether we have sufficiently described a singular set-theoretic universe, fulfilling the one true set theory. I believe rather that the situation is something more like the situation that we have in geometry, where different conceptions of the fundamentals of geometry give rise to fundamentally different geometrical worlds. Similarly, in set theory, different conceptions of the nature of set give rise to different set-theoretic universes with different truths. Some of them have large cardinals, some of them more than others, while others may have fewer. Some have CH and others do not. Indeed, the fact that even amongst the large cardinal theories there isn't a single strongest theory shows that this multiverse or pluralist perspective exists and indeed must exist to a certain small extent even within proponents of large cardinal set theory. Large cardinal set theorists are generally willing, whenever it is convenient, to change their theory to a stronger theory with more and larger large cardinals.

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    $\begingroup$ I've read both papers and find most of your arguments compelling, and they have all but reversed my belief in monism. I've yet to meet your challenge of defining the "naturality" of axioms, even though I still believe that some are natural (like extensionality) and others not (like $2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_{159}$). Dismissing the instrumentalist dodge as unnatural means that consistency claims are unnatural, which is clearly not the case. Perhaps that's the best argument that can be given for their truth. But $V = L$ and GCH are consistent, and more obviously so, though few believe they're true. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 18 at 0:33
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    $\begingroup$ I see the existence of very large cardinals as the only explanation for why very large cardinals produce many diverse near inconsistencies without producing any actual inconsistency (unless there is a more mundane explanation for this observation). $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 18 at 0:54
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    $\begingroup$ Excellent answer to my question! If one believes in the consistency of a given large cardinal axiom, one might assert the existence of a transitive model of the theory without asserting the existence of such a cardinal, no less cardinals higher in the consistency hierarchy. A purported explanation for why ZFC+inaccessible is consistent is that inaccessibles exist. But, of course, ZFC+inaccessible cannot prove that ZFC+inaccessible is consistent, unless it's inconsistent. So then maybe you instead you appeal to Mahlo cardinals. But then you have the same issue. When does it stop? $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 18 at 5:52
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    $\begingroup$ I admit that I don't find your arguments in www.qeios.com/read/T63YDP quite as compelling. Even if no one has defined what it means for an axiom, LCA or otherwise, to be "natural," one can usually recognize those that are and those that aren't. Your argument reminded me of Plato's, that we can't know any just or unjust actions if we can't say what justice is. Certainly the axioms of ZFC are natural. Your nonlinear examples would never be taken seriously as additional axioms for set theory. And at least in philosophy one refers to "natural kinds": plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/ $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 20 at 0:14
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    $\begingroup$ ...Also, one question arose in your paper: what does Con(ZFC) mean, if as you say the meaning of Con(T) depends on the enumeration of the axioms of T? $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 20 at 0:15
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I think it can be reasonably argued that the large cardinal notions follow a common conceptual pattern, even a semi-formal template. Once we understood the characterization of measurable cardinals in terms of elementary embeddings, supercompacts were a natural next thought. Then how about hypothesizing the ultimate closure, $j: V\to V$? asked Reinhardt. Kunen showed this went too far. So we looked at the argument and tried to see how close to the edge we could step.

Now some of the “in-between” large cardinals like Ramsey, Woodin, Vopenka, etc, might not obviously fit into the template, on first glance, but we can prove that they are subsumed by simpler hypotheses.

The gist of the argument from those who insist on the truth of large cardinals is that this the only explanation of their many consequences, including consistency. I think this is not true. There is an explanation along the lines of, we developed a theoretical framework that can be modified and strengthened in somewhat obvious ways, and this results in a coherent system of hypotheses. We looked at the limits of this framework, and tried to find the exact breaking point.

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    $\begingroup$ This is a nice perspective. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 18 at 15:03
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    $\begingroup$ How would this explanation explain both the apparent consistency along with the overabundance of near inconsistencies in the large cardinal hierarchy? $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 21 at 12:41
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    $\begingroup$ @JosephVanName Because we focused a lot of energy on finding the boundary between consistency and inconsistency. When we play around near the edge, we encounter “near inconsistency”. As for why the boundary lies exactly where it does (which we don’t know with certainty), I think that’s just a bare fact. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 21 at 14:11
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    $\begingroup$ @JesseElliott It seems you’re saying something more. Empirically, there doesn’t seem to be an alternative system to large cardinals with similar properties, and this calls out for explanation. I think that’s a good point. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 24 at 9:22
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    $\begingroup$ @მამუკაჯიბლაძე Not among the “standard” ones, meaning those that can be characterized by definable elementary embeddings. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 26 at 7:17
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I am convinced in the existence of large cardinals by the presence of many near inconsistencies in the large cardinal hierarchy without any actual inconsistency (and for other reasons as well that others have elaborated on elsewhere). I have written computer programs that search for inconsistencies in the large cardinal hierarchy and which easily produce many near inconsistencies. I see no explanation for these near inconsistencies except for the existence of very large cardinals. If large cardinals exist, then it is possible that they behave in exotic ways that look to us as if the theory of large cardinals is always on the verge of an inconsistency. But if large cardinals do not exist, then we do not have an explanation for so many near inconsistencies.

Algebras of rank-into-rank embeddings:

Let $\lambda$ be a cardinal, and let $\mathcal{E}_\lambda$ be the set of all elementary embeddings $j:V_\lambda\rightarrow V_\lambda$. Then recall that $\mathcal{E}_\lambda$ may be endowed with an algebraic operation $*$ defined by $j*k=\bigcup_{\alpha<\lambda}j(k|_{V_\alpha})$. If $\gamma<\lambda$ and $\gamma$ is a limit ordinal, then define a congruence $\equiv^\gamma$ on $(\mathcal{E}_\lambda,*,\circ)$ by setting $j\equiv^\gamma k$ iff $j(x)\cap V_\gamma=k(x)\cap V_\gamma$ whenever $x\in V_\gamma$. The algebra $\mathcal{E}_\lambda$ satisfies the self-distributivity identity $j*(k*l)=(j*k)*(j*l)$

We say that an algebra $(X,*,1)$ is a reduced Laver-like algebra if it satisfies the self-distributivity identity $x*(y*z)=(x*y)*(x*z)$ along with $x*1=1,1*x=x$ and where if $x_n\in X$ for each $n\geq 0$, then $x_0*\dots*x_N=1$ for some $N$ (we abide by the convention that the implied parentheses are grouped on the left so that $a*b*c*d=((a*b)*c)*d$). The algebra $\mathcal{E}_\lambda/\equiv^\gamma$ is always a reduced Laver-like algebra, but there exists an 11 element Laver-like algebra that does not embed in any $\mathcal{E}_\lambda/\equiv^\gamma$.

If $(X,*,1)$ is a Laver-like algebra, then define an operation $*_n$ for all $n\geq 0$ by setting $x*_0y=y,x*_{n+1}y=x*(x*_ny)$ for all $n$ and set $x*_\infty y=\lim_{n\rightarrow\infty}x*_ny$. Then we say that $\text{crit}(x)\leq\text{crit}(y)$ precisely when $x*_\infty y=1$. The set $\text{crit}[X]=\{\text{crit}(x):x\in X\}$ is always a linearly ordered set.

Suppose that $(X,*,1)$ is a reduced Laver-like algebra. Then define an equivalence relation $\simeq_{\text{cmx}}$ on $X$ by setting $x\simeq_{\text{cmx}}y$ if and only if $x*a_1*\dots*a_r=1\Leftrightarrow y*a_1*\dots*a_r=1$ for all $a_1,\dots,a_r\in X$ and $r\geq 0$. Then $\simeq_{\text{cmx}}$ is a congruence. We say that two Laver-like algebras with generating sets $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})$ and $(Y,*,1,(y_a)_{a\in A})$ are critically equivalent if $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})/\simeq_{\text{cmx}}$ is isomorphic to $(Y,*,1,(y_a)_{a\in A})/\simeq_{\text{cmx}}.$

For many purposes, we only care about reduced Laver-like algebras up to critical equivalence.

I have developed an algorithm that takes a finite Laver-like algebra $(X,*,1)$ with finite generating set $(x_a)_{a\in A}$ as an input and returns all algebras with generating sets $(Y,*,1,(y_a)_{a\in A})$ up-to-critical equivalence such that $|\text{crit}[Y]|=|\text{crit}[X]|+1$ and where there is a surjective homomorphism $\phi:Y\rightarrow X$ with $\phi(y_a)=x_a$ for all $a.$ In other words, this algorithm takes a finite Laver-like algebra as an input and returns all Laver-like algebras with one more critical point up to critical equivalence but the same generating set. By repeatedly applying this algorithm, one can exhaustively search for Laver-like algebras that satisfy various conditions.

Suppose that $P$ is a property of Laver-like algebras and that if $(X,*,1),(Y,*,1)$ are critically equivalent Laver-like algebras, then $(X,*,1)$ satisfies $P$ if and only if $(Y,*,1)$ satisfies $P$. Suppose furthermore that large cardinals imply the existence of a subalgebra of some $\mathcal{E}_\lambda/\equiv^\gamma$ that satisfies $P$. Then if we exhaustively search for algebras up-to-critical-equivalence that satisfy Property $P$ but we turn up empty handed, then we have obtained an inconsistency in the large cardinal hierarchy. I have never observed such an inconsistency (except for the time where there was a bug in the code). But if an exhaustive search turns up just one algebra that satisfies Property $P$ up-to-critical equivalence, then we have obtained a near inconsistency.

Consistency tests:

Here are some ways to produce new Laver-like algebras from old ones. One can then perform an exhaustive search to make sure that these Laver-like algebras really exist or whether we have an inconsistency.

Test 1: Roots of algebras. Suppose that $t$ is a term in the language with function symbols $*,\circ$. Let $j_1,\dots,j_r:V_{\lambda+1}\rightarrow V_{\lambda+1}$ be elementary embeddings. Then by elementarity $\exists x_1,\dots,x_r\in\mathcal{E}_\lambda,t(x_1,\dots,x_r)*x_s=j_s|_{V_\lambda}$ if and only if $\exists x_1,\dots,x_r\in\mathcal{E}_\lambda,t(x_1,\dots,x_r)*x_s=t(j_1,\dots,j_r)*j_s|_{V_\lambda}$ which is true. Therefore $\exists x_1,\dots,x_r\in\mathcal{E}_\lambda,t(x_1,\dots,x_r)*x_s=j_s|_{V_\lambda}$. We can use these new elementary embeddings to produce Laver-like algebras, but an exhaustive backtracking search of these Laver-like algebras may verify that these Laver-like algebras actually exist.

For the following tests, let $\text{crit}_n(j_1,\dots,j_r)$ be the $n$-th element of the set $\{\text{crit}(k):k\in\langle j_1,\dots,j_r\rangle\}$ (which has order type $\omega$).

Test 2: Adding an ordinal. Suppose that $g$ is a well-ordering of $V_\lambda$ where if $\text{Rank}(x)<\text{Rank}(y)$, then $g(x)<g(y)$. Let $\mathcal{E}_\lambda[g]$ be the set of all elementary embeddings $j$ in $\mathcal{E}_\lambda$ where $j(g(x))=g(j(x))$ for all $x$. The non-emptyness of $\mathcal{E}_\lambda[g]\setminus\{1_{V_\lambda}\}$ follows whenever $g$ is a $V_\lambda$-definable well-ordering which exists whenever $V_\lambda\models V=HOD$, but there is a simpler argument for the non-emptyness that holds in all models.

Suppose now that $j_1,\dots,j_r\in\mathcal{E}_\lambda[g]\setminus\{1_{V_\lambda}\}$. Let $\gamma=\text{crit}_n(j_1,\dots,j_r)$. Then since $\langle j_1,\dots,j_r\rangle/\equiv^\gamma$ is finite, there are sets $A_1,\dots,A_s\in V_\gamma$ where if $j,k\in\langle j_1,\dots,j_r\rangle$, then $j\not\equiv^\gamma k$, then $j(A_s)\cap V_\gamma\neq k(A_s)\cap V_\gamma$ for some $s$. Therefore, if we set $A=\{A_1,\dots,A_s\}$, then whenever $j,k\in\langle j_1,\dots,j_r\rangle$, if $j\not\equiv^\gamma k$, then $j(A)\neq k(A)$. Therefore, if we set $\alpha=g(A)\cdot\omega$, then $\alpha<\gamma$ but if $j\not\equiv^\gamma k$, then $j(\alpha)\neq k(\alpha)$. The ordinal $\alpha$ may be treated as an element in a Laver-like algebra that extends $\mathcal{E}_\lambda/\equiv^\delta$, but we can exhaustively search for Laver-like algebras that have isomorphic copies of the ordinal $\alpha$.

Test 3: Extending a generator.

With rank-into-rank embeddings, one can always extend the algebra $\langle j_1,\dots,j_r\rangle/\equiv^{\text{crit}_n(j_1,\dots,j_r)}$ to the larger algebra $\langle j_1,\dots,j_r\rangle/\equiv^{\text{crit}_{n+1}(j_1,\dots,j_r)}$, but we can do even better by taking more control over the extension.

Proposition: Suppose that $j_1,\dots,j_r\in\mathcal{E}_\lambda\setminus\{1_{V_\lambda}\}$ and $n$ is a natural number. Then there are $k_1,\dots,k_r\in\langle j_1,\dots,j_r\rangle$ where $k_s\equiv^{\text{crit}_n(j_1,\dots,j_r)}j_s$ for all $s$ but where if $\text{crit}(k_{a_1}*\dots*k_{a_s})=\text{crit}_n(k_1,\dots,k_r)$ and $\text{crit}(k_{a_1}*\dots*k_{a_t})<\text{crit}_n(k_1,\dots,k_r)$ for all $1\leq t<s$, then $a_1=1$.

Some data

We say that a Laver-like algebra $(X,*,1)$ with generating set $(x_a)_{a\in A}$ is superreduced if $x*x=x*y=y*x=y*y=1$ implies that $x=y$, and if $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})$ is superreduced, then we say that $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})$ is a superreduced multigenic Laver table if whenever $(Z,*,1,(z_a)_{a\in A})$ is critically equivalent to $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})$, there is a surjective homomorphism $\phi:X\rightarrow Z$ with $\phi(x_a)=z_a$ for $a\in A$. Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a class of superreduced multigenic Laver tables such that if $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})$ is a superreduced multigenic Laver table, then there is a unique $(Y,*,1,(Y_a)_{a\in A})\in S$ isomorphic to $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})$ (we do not need the axiom of choice to construct $\mathcal{S}$ since there is a standard construction of $\mathcal{S}$). Then let's call the elements of $\mathcal{S}$ standard multigenic Laver tables.

Suppose that $(X,*,1)$ is a standard superreduced Laver-like algebra generated by $(x_a)_{a\in A}$. For each string $g$ over the alphabet $A$, let $\text{Ext}(g,(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A}))$ be the set of all standard superreduced multigenic Laver tables where we set $\text{Ext}(\epsilon,(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A}))=\{(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})\}$ and where if $g$ is a string in $A^*$ and $a_0\in A$, then $\text{Ext}(ga_0,(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A}))$ is the set of all standard superreduced multigenic Laver tables $(Z,*,1,(z_a)_{a\in A})$ where there is some $(Y,*,1,(y_a)_{a\in A})\in \text{Ext}(ga_0,(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A}))$ and where if $\text{crit}(z_{a_1}*\dots*z_{a_s})=\max(\text{crit}[Z]\setminus\{\text{crit}(1)\})$ and $\text{crit}(z_{a_1}*\dots*z_{a_t})<\text{crit}(z_{a_1}*\dots*z_{a_s})$ whenever $1\leq t<s$, then $a_1=a_0$, and where $|\text{crit}[Z]|=|\text{crit}[Y]|+1$ and there is a surjective homomorphism $\phi:Z\rightarrow Y$ with $\phi(z_a)=y_a$ for all $a\in A$.

Let $A=\{a,b,c\}$. Let $(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})$ be the standard superreduced multigenic Laver table with $|X/\simeq_{\text{cmx}}|=3$ and $\text{crit}(x_a)<\text{crit}(x_b)<\text{crit}(x_c)$. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the collection of strings $g$ over the alphabet $A$ where if $h$ is a prefix of $g$, then $|\text{Ext}(h,(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A}))|=1$ and where if $Y\in\text{Ext}(g,(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A}))$, then $|Y|\leq 54$ and where $\text{crit}(x*x*y)\leq\text{crit}(x*y)$ for all $x,y\in Y$. Then there are 15215 elements in $\mathcal{A}$. I have computed $\mathcal{A}$ using one CPU core in 220 seconds.

Orthogonality

In the above example, many of the near inconsistencies that I have found are similar to one another. To see why this is the case, we will have to look at some non-commutative polynomials. If $(X,*,1)$ is a Laver-like algebra with generating set $(x_a)_{a\in A}$, and $\alpha$ is a critical point, then define a non-commutative polynomial $p_\alpha((z_a)_{a\in A})=\{z_{a_1}\dots z_{a_r}:\text{crit}(x_{a_1}*\dots x_{a_r})=\alpha,\forall s<r,\text{crit}(x_{a_1}*\dots x_{a_r})<\alpha\}.$ Let $M(X,*,1,(x_a)_{a\in A})=p_{\beta}((z_a)_{a\in a})$ where $\beta=\max(\text{crit}[X]\setminus\{\text{crit}(1)\})$.

Then $|M[\mathcal{A}]|=65$. This indicates that the 15215 near inconsistencies are all very similar to one another. Fortunately, by combining several inconsistency tests together, one can achieve a far more diverse collection of near inconsistencies.

Conclusion

I have not done much research on these kinds of near inconsistencies (and neither has anyone else), so there is a meager possibility that there is an explanation for these near inconsistencies or a theorem in ZFC that explains why we are seeing these near inconsistencies. There is also the slight possibility that these near inconsistencies arise in a universe without very large cardinals because a similar structure that also produces these near inconsistencies exists (this could be an inner model or an algebraic structure).

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    $\begingroup$ We know that it is relatively consistent that inconsistency arises at any given place in the hierarchy of consistency strength. It is consistent to hold that 3 inaccessibles are inconsistent, but not 2, or that a $\kappa^{+(17)}$-supercompact $\kappa$ is inconsistent, but not a $\kappa^{+(16)}$-supercompact $\kappa$, and so forth. So how can there be a robust concept of "near inconsistency"? Inconsistency could be anywhere, at any given level, even in your systems, and we don't have any way of finding out, except by exhibiting actual inconsistencies, which are few. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 27 at 22:22
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    $\begingroup$ @JoelDavidHamkins I did not formalize what I mean by a near inconsistency (I do not know if this is possible), but in all the 15215 algebras, large cardinals prove that there $\exists x P(x)$ for some property $P$, but we get a near inconsistency since an exhaustive search shows in PA that there is only one object satisfying Property P. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 27 at 22:46
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    $\begingroup$ @JoelDavidHamkins I prefer to actually look at the data and see whether it is just an accident that the large cardinals are consistent. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 27 at 23:02
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    $\begingroup$ Why doesn’t the existence of a countable transitive model of these axioms serve the same explanatory role? $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 28 at 10:24
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    $\begingroup$ @MonroeEskew The set of elementary embeddings from $V_\lambda$ to itself comes with a complete metric, and we have and use well orderings in the inconsistency search. But I agree that we can possibly axiomatize this using countable or Polish structures in a way that the axiomatic system still exhibits our near inconsistencies and even more (possibly with partially (Heyting semilattice) ordered critical points). But even if this works, this will be a more complex axiomatization than simply stating that there is a rank-into-rank embedding. It is worth doing though. $\endgroup$ Commented Sep 28 at 16:13

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