Timeline for Is there a truly general voting impossibility theorem that applies to real elections?

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Jul 10, 2016 at 6:41	comment	added	Marcus Pivato		As for manipulating the rule by creating "clones" of yourself: basically any social choice rule is vulnerable to this sort of manipulation. Normally we assume that it is impossible for agents to "clone" themselves. As for humans vs. ants: this raises a deep philosophical question: which entities should have "moral weight" in your utilitarian calculus, and how much weight? Most people think only humans should have "moral weight". Some philosophers (like Peter Singer) think animals should also have moral weight, but that's a minority view.
Jul 10, 2016 at 6:36	comment	added	Marcus Pivato		Hi Qiaochu. I'm not really sure why you say Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem is a "no-go" theorem. That suggests that it is an "impossibility theorem" (i.e. "There is no social choice rule satisfying $X$"). Instead, I think of it as an axiomatic characterization theorem ("There is exactly one social choice rule satisfying $X$"). Of course, you might not like the social choice rule in question, but that doesn't make it a "no go" result. However, you are completely correct that interpersonal utility comparisons are a still-unsolved problem.
Jul 18, 2014 at 19:53	history	answered	Qiaochu Yuan	CC BY-SA 3.0