Timeline for Is there a truly general voting impossibility theorem that applies to real elections?
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| Jul 10, 2016 at 6:46 | comment | added | Marcus Pivato | Also, you are correct that, in "range voting" (which is basically the voting rule analog of relative utilitarianism), each voter's optimal strategy is to assign a value of "0" or "1" to almost all of the alternatives, in almost all situations. The precise statement is a theorem in the paper Preference Intensity Representation: Strategic Overstating in Large Elections by Matias Núñez and Jean-François Laslier. | |
| Jul 10, 2016 at 6:28 | comment | added | Marcus Pivato | The version of utilitarianism where you rescale each person's utility to range over [0,1] is called relative utilitarianism, and is the subject of several academic papers. I agree with your concern that there are some social choice problems where one person just has much more intense preferences than another. So we should not apply the [0,1] utility rescaling to a particular problem. For the [0,1] rescaling to be normatively appealing, 0 must stand for the "worst possible life" and 1 for the "best possible life", for each person. | |
| Jul 15, 2014 at 15:56 | history | answered | usul | CC BY-SA 3.0 |