(copied from [math.SE][1])

BACKGROUND: A cake has to be divided among 3 people with different tastes, such that each person receives a single connected piece, and no person prefers another person's piece. This problem was unsolved for several tens of years, until [Stromquist (1980)][2] suggested the following division protocol:

> A referee moves a sword from left to right over the cake, hypothetically
> dividing it into a small left piece and a large right piece. 
> Each player holds a knife over what he considers to be the midpoint of
> the right piece. As the referee moves his sword, the players continually
> adjust their knives, always keeping them parallel to the sword.
> When any player shouts "cut", the cake is cut by the sword and by
> whichever of the players' knives happens to be the middle one of the three.

> The player who shouted "cut" receives the left piece. He must be satisfied,
> because he knew what all three pieces would be when he said the word.
> Then the player whose knife ended nearest to the sword, if he didn't 
> shout "cut", takes the centerpiece; and the player whose knife was farthest
> from the sword, if he didn't shout "cut", takes the right piece. The 
> player whose knife was used to cut the cake, if he hasn't
> already taken the left piece, will be satisfied with whatever piece is left over. 
> If ties must be broken - either because two or three players shout 
> simultaneously or because two or three knives coincide - they may be
> broken arbitrarily.

Usually, protocols for cake-cutting are considered "fair" if each player has a "safe strategy", that is, each player can play in a way that guarantee that he receives a fair share *regardless of what other players do*. For example, consider the classic protocol for 2 players: "I cut, you choose". I (the cutter) have to cut the cake to two pieces that I consider to be of equal value, but, even if I cut the cake in a very strange manner to two very unequal pieces, *you* still have a safe strategy - you just pick the piece that you consider to be more valuable. So, the protocol is fair for you.

MY QUESTION: Is Stromquist's three knives procedure "fair" in the above sense? I.e., does a player have a strategy that guarantees that he feels no envy, even if the other two players act against their own interest?


  [1]: http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/916884/stromquists-3-knives-procedure
  [2]: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2320951