Apart from your specific example, the idea of
truth-by-accident has been studied in the context of formal
first-order languages, which includes the language of graph
theory, and in his dissertation, Kurt Gödel proved
that the statements that happen to be true in all models of
a first order theory $T$ are exactly the statements that
are provable in $T$. This is his famous [completeness
theorem](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_completeness_theorem).

Thus, any statement expressible in the first-order theory
of groups that happens to be true in all groups will be
provable from the group axioms, and any statement
expressible in the first-order statement of graphs that
happens to be true in all graphs will be provable from the
axioms of graph theory.

Your statement, however, does not seem to be expressible
directly in the language of graph theory, since it also
uses the concept of cardinality and of subgraphs, so the
completeness theorem does not apply directly to it for the
language of graphs. Rather, it is a statement of number
theory, and the relevant models for this case would include
all the standard and nonstandard models of arithmetic.

So the relevant conclusion would be that if the statement
were not provable in the first-order [Peano's axioms
PA](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms), then there
is a nonstandard model of arithmetic having a bad
(pseudo)finite graph.

But the particular form of the statement means that it has
complexity $\Pi^0_1$, which means it is a universal
statement quantifying over the natural numbers, and if any
such statement is independent of PA, then it is true, because if it is true in any
model, then because the standard model is an initial
segment of all the others, it follows that it must be true
in the standard model and hence true. This level of
complexity is the same complexity as many of the
interesting independent statements, including consistency
statements.