undecidable sentences of first-order arithmetic whose truth values are unknown Godel's undecidable sentences in first-order arithmetic were guaranteed to be true, by construction. But are there examples of specific sentences known to be undecidable in first-order arithmetic whose truth values aren't known? I'm thinking, by contrast, of the situation in set theory: CH is undecidable in ZFC, but its truth value is, in some sense, unknown.
Paris and Harrington showed the strengthened finite Ramsey theorem is true (in the sense of provable in second-order arithmetic) but undecidable in first-order arithmetic. I'm asking for "natural" examples in this general vein -- but whose truth values haven't yet been settled.
EDIT. Let me clarify my interest in the question, which is more philosophical than mathematical. I asked it on the basis of the following passage in Peter Koellner's paper "On the Question of Absolute Undecidability":

The above statements of analysis [i.e. all projective sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable] and set theory [i.e. CH] differ from the early arithmetical instances of incompleteness in that their independence does not imply their truth. Moreover, it is not immediately clear whether they are settled at any level of the hierarchy. They are much more serious cases of independence.

What I'm asking is whether there are "much more serious cases" of independence even in first-order arithmetic -- and not in the trivial case of full-on ZFC, like V=L, etc. By a sentence with "unknown truth value," I just mean a sentence that hasn't been proved in a theory stronger than first-order arithmetic. (For example, Paris and Harrington proved the strengthened finite Ramsey theorem in second-order arithmetic.)
 A: I think there is a little misunderstanding.

Paris and Harrington showed the strengthened finite Ramsey theorem is true but unprovable in first-order arithmetic; I don't know if there's a proof that extends the result to full-on undecidability rather than just unprovability.

Indeed, the Wikipedia page is only talking about unprovability, but the negation of the strengthened finite Ramsey theorem is also unprovable in Peano arithmetic for "trivial" reasons: if you can prove this negation, then second order arithmetic can also prove this negation (because second order arithmetic is stronger than Peano arithmetic), so this would mean that second order arithmetic is inconsistent (because second order arithmetic proves the strengthened finite Ramsey theorem).
So if you take for granted that second order arithmetic is consistent, then your example is actually undecidable in Peano arithmetic. And there are other examples like Goodstein's theorem.
A: What you want is called [first-order] Arithmetical Splitting. I have spoken and written a lot about it in the last few years. Send me a message and I can show you some drafts about the current state of this most important topic.
Yes, we should not be able to form any preference, like in the case of PH, where it is clear that PH is better than \neg \PH.
A: Update. I've improved the argument to use only the consistency of $T$. (2/7/12): I corrected some over-statements previously made about Robinson's Q.

I claim that for every statement $\varphi$, there is a variant way
to express it, $\psi$, which is equivalent to the original
statement $\varphi$, but which is formally independent of any
particular desired consistent theory $T$.
In particular, if $\varphi$ is your favorite natural open question,
whose truth value is unknown, then there is an equivalent
formulation of that question which exhibits formal independence in
the way you had requested. In this sense, every open question is
equivalent to an assertion with the property you have requested. I
take this to reveal certain difficult subtleties with your project.
Theorem. Suppose that $\varphi$ is any sentence and $T$ is any consistent theory containing weak arithmetic. Then there is another sentence $\psi$ such that 


*

*$\text{PA}+\text{Con}(T)$ proves that $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are equivalent.

*$T$ does not prove $\psi$.

*$T$ does not prove $\neg\psi$. 


Proof. Let $R$ be the Rosser sentence for $T$, the self-referential assertion that for any proof of $R$ in $T$, there is a smaller proof of $\neg R$. The Gödel-Rosser theorem establishes that if $T$ is consistent, then $T$ proves neither $R$ nor $\neg R$. Formalizing the first part of this argument shows that $\text{PA}+\text{Con}(T)$ proves that $R$ is not provable in $T$ and hence that $R$ is vacuously true. Formalizing the second part of this argument shows that $\text{Con}(T)$ implies $\text{Con}(T+R)$, and hence by the incompleteness theorem applied to $T+R$, we deduce that $T+R$ does not prove $\text{Con}(T)$. Thus, $T+R$ is a strictly intermediate theory between $T$ and $T+\text{Con}(T)$. 
Now, let $\psi$ be the assertion $R\to (\text{Con}(T)\wedge \varphi)$. Since $\text{PA}+\text{Con}(T)$ proves $R$, it is easy to see by elementary logic that $\text{PA}+\text{Con}(T)$ proves that $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are equivalent. 
The statement $\psi$, however, is not provable in $T$, since if it were, then $T+R$ would prove $\text{Con}(T)$, which it does not by our observations above. 
Conversely, $\psi$ is not refutable in $T$, since
any such refutation would mean that $T$ proves that the hypothesis
of $\psi$ is true and the conclusion false; in particular, it
would require $T$ to prove the Rosser sentence $R$, which it does not by the Gödel-Rosser theorem. QED
Note that any instance of non-provability from $T$ will require the consistency of $T$, and so one cannot provide a solution to the problem without assuming the theory is consistent.
The observation of the theorem has arisen in some of the philosophical literature you may
have in mind, based on what you said in the question. For example, the claim of the theorem is mentioned in Haim Gaifman's new
paper "On ontology and realism in mathematics," which we read in my course last semester
on the philosophy of set theory; see the discussion on page 24 of Gaifman's paper and specifically footnote 35, where he credits a fixed-point argument to Torkel Franzen, and an independent construction to Harvey Friedman.

My original argument (see edit history) used the sentence $\text{Con}(T)\to(\text{Con}^2(T)\wedge\varphi)$, where $\text{Con}^2(T)$ is the assertion $\text{Con}(T+\text{Con}(T))$, and worked under the assumption that $\text{Con}^2(T)$ is true, relying on the fact that $T+\text{Con}(T)$ is strictly between $T$ and this stronger theory. The current argument uses the essentially similarly idea that $T+R$ is strictly between $T$ and $T+\text{Con}(T)$, thereby reducing the consistency assumption.
A: I'd say Con(ZF) isn't known to be undecidable--it's only undecidable if it's true.  If it's false, that fact is $\Sigma^0_1$ and therefore provable.  We want a sentence that's $\Sigma^0_2$ or higher.
This might be an almost-example: http://www.cs.uchicago.edu/~simon/RES/collatz.pdf
It proves that a generalization of the 3n+1 conjecture is $\Pi_2$-complete.  But it's not quite what is asked, since it's about a family of problems rather than a single sentence.
A: If you'll settle for an important open question that's independent from some weak fragments of PA, the P vs NP problem is an example.  
http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/pnp.pdf discusses this a little bit.  
Or if you'll take a completely artificial problem that's more strongly independent, just generate a very long random proposition in PA's language, by rolling dice.  You won't know its truth value, and from Chaitin's theorem it will almost certainly be independent of any reasonable axiom system.
A: If we omit the qualification "natural" from the question, then, of
course, the most obvious examples are the arithmetized versions of
metamathematical sentences expressing the (absolute) consistency of
ZFC, or any axiom-system of set theory far weaker than ZFC within
which arithmetic can be developed. Indeed, e.g. Con(ZF) is a sentence
of arithmetic that we obtain by Godel-numbering from the
metamathematical sentence "there is no proof of 0=1 from ZF."  And if
ZF is consistent, then Con(ZF) is undecidable in Peano arithmetic with
unknown truth value. Actually, on the one hand, Con(ZF) implies
Con(PA), and the arithmetical proof of $\lnot$Con(ZF) would yield a
direct proof of the inconsistency of ZF.
As far as the "naturalness" condition is concerned, it seems that
there will be no easy way to find "natural" sentences of this
kind. Indeed, some natural candidates as e.g. the Goldbach conjecture
are excluded, since they should be true, if they turn out to be
undecidable. More precisely, any $\Pi_1$ sentence $S$ of arithmetic is true
whenever $S$ is undecidable. Indeed, if $S$ is false, then its negation is
a true $\Sigma_1$ sentence, and Peano arithmetic proves any true
$\Sigma_1$ sentence.
