Are some numbers more irrational than others? Some irrational numbers are transcendental, which makes them in some sense "more irrational" than algebraic numbers. There are also numbers, such as the golden ratio $\varphi$, which are poorly approximable by rationals. But I wonder if there is another sense in which one number is more irrational than another.
Consider the following well known irrationals: 
$\sqrt{2}$,
$\varphi$,
$\log_2{3}$,
$e$,
$\pi$,
$\zeta(3)$.
The proofs of irrationality of these numbers increase in difficulty from grade-school arguments, to calculus, to advanced methods. Other probable irrationals such as $\gamma$ most likely have very difficult proofs.
Can this notion be made precise? Is there a well defined way in which, for example, $\pi$ is more irrational than $e?$
 A: Yes, there is such a thing as the irrationality measure of a real number (I'm not sure if it can be / has already been extended to complex numbers). It is based on the idea that all algebraic numbers (including the golden ratio) are hard to approximate well by rationals, relative to the size of the denominator of the rational used, while it is sometimes possible for a transcendental number to be approximated better. In particular, if a number $\alpha\in\mathbb{R}\setminus\mathbb{Q}$ has the property that there are infinitely many rational approximations $\frac pq\in\mathbb{Q}$ with $|\,\alpha-\frac pq| < q^{-t}$, then $t$ is a lower bound for the irrationality measure of $\alpha$; the larger $t$ is, i.e. the better your approximations are relative to the denominator, the "more irrational" you are, at least from a Diophantine approximation point of view.
From Wikipedia: The irrationality measure of a rational number is 1; the very deep theorem of Thue, Siegel, and Roth shows that any algebraic number that isn't rational has irrationality measure 2; and transcendental numbers will have an irrationality measure $\geq2$. However, as Douglas Zare has pointed out in the comments, the set of transcendental numbers of irrationality measure $>2$ has measure 0, so that in most cases it's unfortunately not useful as a comparison.
It appears that the irrationality measure of $\pi$ is not currently known, but that there are upper bounds; the most recent one I could find is this, which would appear to show that $\mu(\pi)\leq7.6063$. The Wikipedia article claims that $\mu(e)=2$, so whether or not $\pi$ is "more irrational" than $e$ looks like an open question.    
A: In response to a question about the comparative irrationality of real numbers, I wrote, "A theorem only has a difficult or long proof until one finds an easy or short proof."  Mark Sapir replied, "There are only [a] finite number of proofs of length 10^10 so your last statement is wrong."  I would argue, instead, that there are many contentious and, perhaps, wrong assumptions and philosophical misconceptions implicit in Sapir's sentence.  For example, one could state and prove the theorem, "The sum of the first three odd numbers is nine."  One could state and prove another theorem, "The sum of first five odd numbers is 25." One could state and prove another theorem, "The sum of first 100 odd numbers is 10,000." Continuing, one gets to statements of length greater than 10^10, and whose proofs would be even longer.  Of course, someone might have the clever idea of proving inductively that, for all positive integers n, the sum of the first n odd numbers is n^2, and then one has a short proof of infinitely many theorems.  It is exactly this kind of "exponential collapse," often called "progress in science," that I meant when I wrote a proof is long until one finds a short proof.  I would be very interested to know if someone can really prove that there exist theorems that do not have short proofs.  It is more likely that there are only finitely many theorems, and they all have short, simple, and elegant proofs.  This, of course, is simply another description of Erdos' famous book.  
A: The other answers and comments are fascinating, particularly about the irrationality measure, but allow me to give a little more information along the lines
of Mark Sapir's answer by mentioning that there are several
very large, intensely studied hierarchies of complexity for
reals numbers. After the initial familiar notions come
several others...


*

*rational

*algebraic

*computable
The computable reals are those for which we can compute
rational approximations to any desired accuracy, by Turing
machine. (A concept used in computable
analysis.)
The computable subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ are those for which
we can compute yes/no answers for membership in finite
time. For example, all the numbers you mention in the
question, such as $\pi$ and $e$, are computable.


*

*computably enumerable


The c.e. subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ are those for which there
is a computable enumeration procedure. Equivalently, you
can compute the yes answers for membership in finite
time. The concept of relative (oracle) computability leads to the
hierarchy of Turing
degrees,
which measures the comparative computable complexity of a
real.


*

*arithmetic


A real $x$ is arithmetic if it's digits can be defined by
a definition involving only quantification over the natural
numbers and primitive operations. Equivalently, the
arithmetic subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ arise from the
computable subsets of $\mathbb{N}^k$ by projection and
complement. The arithmetic
hierarchy
breaks naturally into levels, such as $\Sigma^0_n$ and
$\Pi^0_n$, corresponding to the logical complexity of these
definitions, and these levels are refined by the Turing
degrees. For example, the set of Turing machine programs
$p$ which compute total functions forms a complete
$\Pi^0_2$ set. The relativized notion leads to the arithmetic degrees.


*

*hyperarithmetic


A real is hyperarithmetic if it can be defined by two
equivalent definitions, one involving just one universal
quantifier over the reals and another having just one
existential quantifier over the reals, and otherwise any
level of arithmetic quantifiers. This is the same as
$\Delta^1_1$. The hyperarithmetic
hierarchy
is stratified in a hierarchy of length $\omega_1^{CK}$, a
lightface version of the Borel hierarchy, in which one uses
uniformly computable countable unions and complements. The
relativized notion leads to the hyperarithmetic degrees, a
hyperarithmetic analogue of the Turing degrees.


*

*projective


A real is projective if it can be defined by a
description that quantifies only over the set of real
numbers, plus natural number quantification and the
primitive operations. The projective
hierarchy
is stratified by considering the logical complexity of
these definitions, with levels $\Sigma^1_n$ and $\Pi^1_n$.
For example, the lightface analytic sets are $\Sigma^1_1$
and co-analytic is $\Pi^1_1$, with hyperarithmetic being
$\Delta^1_1=\Sigma^1_1\cap\Pi^1_1$.


*

*constructible


A real is constructible if it exists in Gödel's
constructible universe
$L$.
The concept of relative constructibility gives rise to the
constructibility degrees, by which $x\sim y\leftrightarrow
L[x]=L[y]$, forming a rich hierarchy.


*

*ordinal-definable


A real (or set) is
ordinal-definable
if there is a definition of it in the language of set
theory, using ordinal parameters. For example, the real
whose $n^{th}$ binary digit is $1$ just in case
$2^{\aleph_n}=\aleph_{n+1}$ is ordinal definable. The class
HOD of all hereditarily ordinal definable sets satisfies
ZFC, but can be strictly smaller than the universe of all
sets.


*

*generic


A real is generic over $L$ (or some other fixed universe
$V$) if it exists in a forcing extension of $L$ (or $V$) by
set forcing. Of course, it is relatively consistent with
ZFC that every real is generic over $L$, since this is true
in $L$ itself, but under some large cardinal axioms, there
are reals, such as $0^\sharp$, that cannot be added by
forcing over $L$.
The higher levels of these latter hierarchies are further
developed and stratified by the enormous variety of models
of set theory arising from large cardinals, various inner
model constructions, forcing extensions and so on, so that
the hierarchy loses its linear nature, becoming instead a
dense jungle of various interacting concepts of set theory.
A: For algebraic numbers one could take as a simple measure the degree of the number (lowest degree of non-zero rational polynomial having the number as a zero).
Of course, degree one are the rationals.
And, degree two (quadratic irrationalities) have for example a nice characterization via being precisely those numbers with infinite yet periodic continued fraction expansion.
Though, others have already commented regarding classification by length/complexity proof and its problems, I wanted to add a (somewhat naive and subjective) remark:
I take the question as seeking (at least partially) some notion that matches (to a certain extent) an intuitive idea of what is more or less irrational.
However, if this is so, then at least for my intuition (of course this being subjective), this would not work well at all, as there are quite different reasons why there is a simple/short proof of irrationality.
For example, comparing the perhaps two simplest arguments for irrationality:
.) the irrationality of roots of integers (other then perfect powers) 
.) the irrationality of a number given by a description of its decimal expansion  (provided it can be easily seen to be non-periodic)  
The former yields only irrational numbers that I consider as very nice and not 'strange' at all.
Yet, using the latter one can get numbers that I consider as rather 'strange' (The obviously irrational number with decimal-expansion all 0 except at prime-place where the digit is 1, and at prime-power places where the digit is 7, has no intuitive meaning for me at all.)
So, a classification that puts those two types close together is not intuitive to me.  
A: I agree with Mark Sapir's comments on shortest formal proofs. Also, Douglas Zare is correct to point out the difficulties of using irrationality measure. A refinement of irrationality measure was proposed by Mahler many years ago. It's rather technical, and instead of presenting the details here I suggest you type the words "Mahler" and "classification" into a search engine and peruse the many items your search will turn up. 
Mahler's classification, like the irrationality measure, suffers from the difficulty of actually calculating which class any given number falls in. 
A: It is easy to invent criteria to compare the irrationality of different numbers, but I doubt that anyone understands irrationality well enough to give a serious criterion.  We do not even know the continued fraction for the cube root of 2.  Nor is the "difficulty" or the length of an irrationality proof a reasonable criterion.  A theorem only has a difficult or long proof until one finds an easy or short proof.
A: In principle, yes, you can measure irrationality of a number by the length of a shortest formal proof (in some formal proof system), something like the Kolmogorov complexity of a sequence. But it is difficult (if at all possible) to compute and the usefulness of it is not clear.  
