The argument, given to me by Hugh Woodin over a drink in Barcelona in September 2016, is a nice retort to "AC is obviously false since there cannot be a well-ordering of the real numbers". It is arguable whether or not it is philosophically sound, but as a retort to a claim that is definitely not sound by itself, it works absolutely great.
If there is no well-ordering of the real numbers, then $\Bbb R\nsubseteq\rm HOD$. Namely, there is a real number which does not belong to $\rm HOD$. Namely, there is a real number which is not definable from ordinal parameters. This is because the class $\rm HOD$ can be well-ordered in a very definable and very concrete way already in $\sf ZF$.
So, if $\Bbb R\setminus\rm HOD\neq\varnothing$, that means that we can instantiate this fact and pick such a real number.
So, which one is it? If you want to claim that it is impossible to exhibit a well-ordering of the reals, and therefore the Axiom of Choice must be false, you should be able to exhibit a real number that is not ordinal definable. Since otherwise, by failing to find a witness for a non-definable real, you either agree that having a definable witness is not necessary for existential statements or else $\Bbb R\subseteq\rm HOD$ after all, in which case it can be well-ordered sans the Axiom of Choice (and one can bootstrap this argument through the von Neumann hierarchy to argue that $V=\rm HOD$).
Is that a good philosophical argument? Probably not. Is it a good comeback to a bad philosophical argument? Absolutely.