It is clear that many different Gödel numberings can work in Gödel's proof. Yet for the proof one just needs a few properties of how the numberings of related sentences are related, and I'm wondering if those few properties are enough to force the numberings to be "essentially the same." This would be an analogue of Rogers's Equivalence Theorem for admissible numberings of the partial computable functions.
Is there some small set of natural axioms (I realize both "small" and "natural" here are informal) such that any numbering of statements of first-order arithmetic and lists thereof that satisfies those axioms is isomorphic (in some precise sense) to the "usual" Gödel numbering (or, let's say, to Gödel's version)?
Here both the axioms and the notion of isomorphism can be defined in the answer. For axioms, just to give an idea of the kind of thing I have in mind, I was hoping for something along the lines of "There are [easily computable? primitive recursive?] functions that do the following....project the numbering of a list to the numbering of its i-th element, take the numbering of a formala of the form $\exists x \varphi(x)$ to the numbering of $\varphi(x)$" etc.
Related but different questions:
- Category of Gödel codings
- Is there any reasonable non-regular Gödel numbering of the language of arithmetic? The condition of "regular" there has to do with the size of the numerical value of the coding, which seems not so connected to my question.