Should there be a true model of set theory? As I understand it, there is a program in set theory to produce an ultimate, canonical model of set theory which, among other things, positively answers the Continuum Hypothesis and various questions about large cardinals.  My question is about the motivation of such a program.  I'll present some of the thoughts that motivate my question and then state my question more precisely at the end.
Naively, one would think that a good first order theory for some subject ought to be able to decide any first-order expressible question about that subject.  Given certain reasonable restrictions on what "good" must entail, this is impossible, due to Godel.  Still, there is a sense that even though a good theory cannot answer every first order question, it should answer a reasonable subset of them.  Further still, there is a sense that for any given subject, there are certain first order propositions that a good theory should not only decide, but decide to be true.
What I just said may sound vague, so in the next two paragraphs I'll add examples of things I personally ought to be true or decidable in a good theory.  The point of these examples is simply to provide background and motivation to the question, and clarify any vagueness, the actual content of those paragraphs is just my opinion and not the real point of the question I'm asking here.
Things that ought to be true
Robinson Arithmetic doesn't decide induction, but induction ought to hold in any good theory of numbers.  Replacement and Foundation aren't decided by Zermelo set theory, but they ought to hold in any decent theory of sets, even if it took decades for these axioms to join the rest of Zermelo's axioms.  Now there may be interesting theories extending Robinson Arithmetic in which induction fails, and interesting theories extending Zermelo set theory in which Replacement or Foundation fail, but these aren't good theories of numbers or sets, respectively.  Now I cannot prove induction or Replacement, and I may not be able to convince the extreme skeptic that my beliefs are nothing more than the result of cultural bias and upbringing.  Nonetheless, I can confidently assert that induction is true amd Replacement holds.  And even if I were tempted to prove these claims based on some more fundamental assumptions, the skeptic could just as well question those assumptions, and this leads to infinite regress.
Things that ought to be decidable
A good theory of numbers ought to decide Goldbach's Conjecture.  A good theory of sets probably ought to decide CH and the existence of various large cardinals.  Again, I can't prove these claims, I'm simply making normative claims about what ought to be true of a theory if it is to be regarded as good.  On the other hand, a good theory need not decide its own consistency.  Excessively contrived formulas need not be decidable by a good theory either (e.g. formulas constructed simply to prove a certain theory is incomplete).
Main Question
I feel that CH and the existence or non-existence of large cardinals should be decidable in a good set theory, or in the same vein, if there are to be some canonical models of set theory, they should all decide these questions the same way.  
But various prominent set theorists${}^{\dagger}$ believe further that CH should be true and large cardinals should exist in the "true $V$."  What are some of the motivations for these beliefs?
[EDIT]
Although I feel this question is different from ones that have already been asked here, let me further distinguish my question by adding that I've heard the usual responses such as:  


*

*There are models with very nice structural properties in which large cardinals exist

*Large cardinal axioms form a surprisingly linear hierarchy

*They decide many natural questions

*They fit together in a way that gives a nice, coherent picture of the universe

*Why not add them?


These responses implicitly appear to justify large cardinal axioms on some non-classical, non-platonist notion of truth - some combination of an aesthetic/pragmatic/coherentist theory of truth.  So perhaps I should refine my question to be:
What motivates many set theorists to evaluate new axioms by these non-classical standards (or am I way off base)?
I should emphasize that I'm not only interested in the justification of these new axioms, but the motivation behind justifying these axioms the way that set theorists appear to justify them, as these axioms seem to be justified in a categorically different way from how Peano's axioms or Zermelo's axioms are justified.
[/EDIT]
${}^{\dagger}$This Wikipedia article on Large Cardinals mentions the Cabal for instance.
Secondary Question
I've made some specific claims about specific statements in specific theories that I feel ought to be true or ought to at least be decidable.  Admittedly I haven't given any general explanations for what sort of things ought to be true, false, decidable, or neither, I've just stated my opinion on a few specific sentences.  I doubt one could give a totally general account distinguishing the class of problems that ought to be decidable from the class of problems that needn't be (e.g. make a categorical distinction between statements "like" CH versus statements "like" Godel's self-referential sentence).  I don't think it's the type of question amenable to total generalization or formalization.  Nonetheless:
Can anyone shed some light on the apparent distinction between questions that a good theory ought to decide and those a good theory needn't decide?
 A: Two weeks ago a conference was held on precisely the topic
of your question, the Workshop on Set Theory and the
Philosophy of
Mathematics
at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. The
conference description was:


Hilbert, in his celebrated address to the Second International
      Congress of Mathematicians held at Paris in 1900, expressed the
      view that all mathematical problems are solvable by the application
      of pure reason. At that time, he could not have anticipated the fate
      that awaited the first two problems on his list of twenty-three,
      namely, Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and the problem of the consistency
      of an axiom system adequate to develop real analysis. The Gödel
      Incompleteness Theorems and the Gödel-Cohen demonstration of the
      independence of CH from ZFC make clear that continued confidence in
      the unrestricted scope of pure reason in application to mathematics
      cannot be founded on trust in its power to squeeze the utmost from
      settled axiomatic theories which are constitutive of their respective
      domains. The goal of our Workshop is to consider the extent to which it
      may be possible to frame new axioms for set theory that
      both settle the Continuum Hypothesis and satisfy reasonable
      standards of justification. The recent success of set
      theorists in establishing deep connections between large
      cardinal hypotheses and hypotheses of definable determinacy
      suggests that it is possible to find rational justification
      for new axioms that far outstrip the evident truths about
      the cumulative hierarchy of sets, first codified by Zermelo
      and later supplemented and refined by others, in their
      power to settle questions about real analysis. The Workshop
      will focus on both the exploration of promising
      mathematical developments and on philosophical analysis of
      the nature of rational justification in the context of set
      theory.


Speakers included Hugh Woodin, Justin Moore, John Burgess,
Aki Kanamori, Tony Martin, Juliette Kennedy, Harvey
Friedman, Andreas Blass, Peter Koellner, John Steel, James
Cummings, Kai Hauser and myself. Bob Solovay also attended.
Several speakers have made their slides available on the
conference page, and I believe that they are organizing a
conference proceedings volume.
Without going into any details, let me say merely that in
my own talk (slides
here) I argued
against the position that there should be a unique theory
as in your question, by outlining the case for a multiverse
view in set theory, the view that we have multiple distinct
concepts of set, each giving rise to its own set-theoretic
universe. Thus, the concept of set has shattered into
myriad distinct set concepts, much as the ancient concepts
of geometry shattered with the discovery of non-euclidean
geometry and the rise of a modern geometrical perspective.
On the multiverse view, the CH question is a settled
question---we understand in a very deep way that the CH and
$\neg$CH are both dense in the multiverse, in the sense
that we can easily obtain either one in a forcing extension
of any given universe, while also controlling other
set-theoretic phenomenon. I also gave an argument for why
the traditionally proposed template for settling CH---where
one finds a new natural axiom that implies CH or that
implies $\neg$CH---is impossible.
Meanwhile, other speakers gave arguments closer to the
position that you seem to favor in your question. In
particular, Woodin described his vision for the Ultimate L,
and you can see his slides.
A: As was pointed out in some answers to this question, since the large cardinal axiom are linearly ordered by consistency strength, there is a natural direction in which we can strengthen set theory.
Since we want to work in a strong theory, it makes sense to assume the existence of large cardinals.  If sufficiently large cardinals exist, a lot of questions about projective sets of real and so on are decided, which is good.  
On the other hand, the existence of large cardinals alone does not decide CH.
However, Woodin is working on finding new axioms that are "natural" and do decide things like CH.  The ideas involved in this are things like "the universe should be canonical in some sense, but still sufficiently rich" and 
"forcing should not have too much of an effect on the set-theoretic universe".  
Until some time ago, these considerations indicated that the size of the set of real numbers should be $\aleph_2$, recent results of Woodin seem to hint at CH. 
Shelah takes a completely different view on this: ZFC is the right foundation of mathematics, and much more is provable in ZFC than was initially thought after the invention of forcing.  For example, a version of the generalized continuum hypothesis actually holds
after removing some "initial noise" from the picture.
Unfortunately, most of these results are not really concerned with objects of everyday mathematics.
I don't know whether anyone has compiled a list of statements that should be decidable.
CH should certainly be on the list, but it seems that mainstream mathematics is happy with
(and, to a large extent, not really interested in) the current status of the foundations of
mathematics.  
A: Yes, but we shouldn't be able to see all the theorems
If we work Morse-Kelley set theory, the "true" model of set theory is obvious: $(V, \in)$. This model has some very nice properties:


*

*Satisfies $ZFC$

*Satisfies the set theoretic statements of $MK$

*Decides the Continuum Hypothesis

*Decides all the large cardinal axioms

*Decides all statements in arithmetic and set theory


So pretty awesome, right? So why don't we use it? Because we can't actually use it, we can only study it. Namely, we can prove that $(V, \in) \models CH \lor (V, \in) \models \lnot CH$, but we can't prove either one individually.
Nethertheless, if your working in Morse-Kelley set theory, it is as real as $\mathbb N$, despite its uncomputability. We can do all the regular model theoretic things we like with it, it gives us a true theory of sets (again, undecidable), etc... It's similar to how ZFC has the Axiom of infinity, which implies that there exists a true model of arithmetic (i.e. the natural numbers), despite it being unable to answer many questions about it.
