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Mathematicians often express comments like "X is true because Y and Z are true". One's sense of mathematical causation is also a major part of mathematical intuition.

But causality per se is not, as far as I know, a defined concept in mathematics.

Does there exist a rigorous concept of causality that allows one to state that a certain collection of mathematical truths "causes" another one to be true?

(Edit:) I should make clear that I am not just referring to when it is possible to prove that a statement is a logical consequence of a set of other statements.

Very often, after a subject in mathematics becomes mature, the eventual most widely accepted or repeated proofs of something may look very little like the original proof.

But then, many years later, that eventual proof has often remained the same.

It is then, when a subject is felt to be very well understood and perhaps even generalized, that it can be seen in context, and the sense of what causes what tends to become most striking.

I feel that as a field of mathematics becomes, asymptotically, more established [and here we stipulate that in truth no field is immune from potential upheaval, eventually], it becomes like the trunk of an old tree: quite firmly established and unlikely to change much in the near future, maybe not in over 100 years.

The reasons for this might include that the apparently "shortest" proof of a given theorem hasn't changed in a long time. So we're thinking metrically.

Or, it may turn out that — as with the Pythagorean Theorem — there are many paths to the same result and not so easy to choose one among them. Not to mention that there are different axiom systems that allow the same theorems.

These similes lead me to think that if there is a Book with the best proof of everything, the theorems somehow lie in a metric space, probably a tree, much as Conway's surreal numbers are born at a certain point and have a certain distance from each other.

And if this is all the case, then perhaps Mathematics in its (partially) finished state might resemble a riemannian manifold, with lots of paths to get from here to there, but (usually) only one shortest one. The Pythagorean Theorem might be the exceptional case that can arise, like with a pair of antipodal points on a n-sphere.

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    $\begingroup$ Reverse mathematics is sort of like this: investigating which theorems imply which other theorems, in very weak background systems. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 4, 2023 at 23:45
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    $\begingroup$ @AlecRhea May be he does, maybe he doesn't. The opinion is certainly too strong to be literally true, but I wouldn't call it completely ungrounded either. Anyway, I'm trying to understand the question as posted and fail. The answers so far somehow seem (to me) to miss the essence of it either... Do you understand what exactly the OP is looking for (from his edit, it is clear that it is certainly not just some kind of "modus ponens")? $\endgroup$
    – fedja
    Commented Apr 5, 2023 at 4:48
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    $\begingroup$ When I say mathematics I mean pure mathematics, and my point was only that, as I see it, that kind of rigor is what defines mathematics. Any other discipline that uses the same level of rigor is, by definition, mathematics (whatever else it may be). $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 5, 2023 at 6:04
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    $\begingroup$ What you're calling 'rigor' might be better dubbed 'precision of thought', and sure, mathematics is completely precise thought. Rigor exists elsewhere, but it's difficult/potentially impossible to think completely precisely about 'reality' as physicists/biologists etc. try to do. We can think with complete precision about our subject because we choose to think about things that are far simpler than the whole of reality (or any individual piece of reality). $\endgroup$
    – Alec Rhea
    Commented Apr 5, 2023 at 9:02
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    $\begingroup$ @LSpice I had to look up the Free Dictionary to realize that by SEP you meant Shipbuilders' Estimating Package. :-) $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 5, 2023 at 22:46

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The short answer, as you surely suspected, is that there is no rigorous notion of the type you're asking for, that would allow us to say that (in a particular case) that $X$ definitely causes $Y$, or that $X$ definitely does not cause $Y$.

In an answer to another MO question, I gave some pointers to some mathematical approaches to studying causation. But I don't think that these really get at what you're interested in, which sounds a lot like an account of mathematical explanation, a notoriously open-ended topic.

Somewhat closer might be relevance logic. Relevance logic at least tries to address the issue that if you add irrelevant hypotheses to a theorem, everything looks fine as far as logical correctness goes, but ideally we'd like some way of formally identifying their irrelevance.

If you want to pursue this idea, then I'd recommend that you begin by collecting what you consider to be clear examples of the phenomenon you're interested in. They could be elementary (e.g., what about the proof that a chessboard with opposite corners removed cannot be tiled by dominos?) or more sophisticated (e.g., perhaps cohomological obstructions explain why certain things are impossible?). Negative examples could also be useful; e.g., what if something seems to be true by accident, or has many different proofs (Pythagorean theorem, quadratic reciprocity)? If nothing else, examples would help clarify your question.

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    $\begingroup$ As a possible cautionary example, I was recently reading the Preface to the Encyclopedia of Special Functions. In the 1970s, Dick Askey felt that "the one-variable theory was more or less complete" and that "at the time, this was indeed how many people felt." Then of course came a rash of new developments. It would not be hard to give more examples of this sort of thing. This is not to deny that mathematical subjects do mature over time and that a feeling of stability can emerge. But such feelings can be the result of a failure of imagination and not anything intrinsic to the subject matter. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 6, 2023 at 3:32
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    $\begingroup$ Also, I wonder if you really want an account of causality rather than explanation. For comparison, in special relativity, there is a notion of causality (light cones), but physicists regard the theory as being explained by two axioms (constancy of the speed of light, and the relativity principle). Is a mature theory best viewed as elucidating causal relationships among mathematical objects, or as explaining mathematical phenomena? I lean toward the latter, but if you really think causality is the right notion, then that is worth clarifying. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 6, 2023 at 12:20
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    $\begingroup$ @DanielAsimov In special relativity, an event A at a certain spacetime location cannot "cause" event B if the spacetime location of B is outside the light cone of A. Causation is a relationship between spacetime events. By contrast, the constancy of the speed of light is not 'caused' by anything, nor does it 'cause' other things. Nevertheless, it plays an important explanatory role; it is used to build a coherent account of how the physical universe works. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 7, 2023 at 23:54
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    $\begingroup$ (continued) If we use the words in mathematics in an analogous way, then we might expect causality to be a relationship between mathematical structures or mathematical properties. Maybe what the Gauss-Bonnet theorem is telling us is that the integral of the curvature is 'caused' by the topology of the surface? However, even if we say that, we might also say that an unenlightening proof of Gauss-Bonnet fails to 'explain' why the theorem is true; we seek instead a proof that gives us a sense of 'understanding.' $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 8, 2023 at 0:05
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    $\begingroup$ That is, the term 'causality' seems to suggest an account of which facts are related to which other facts, along with some 'directionality' (presumably if A causes B then B does not cause A). But a complete catalog of such facts may still leave as perplexed as to why those facts are true; an 'explanation' on the other hand gives us a coherent intellectual framework. So I'm wondering what you're referring to when you use the term 'causality.' Is it closer to what I've been calling causality, or closer to what I've been calling explanation? $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 8, 2023 at 0:10

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