3 players are playing a game where they get to pick independently without knowing the other players picks one of 2 prizes (A,B) and the payout is (a,b) for the two prizes, divided by how many people picked the specific prize.

For example, if the prizes are (3,1) and 2 people picks A and 1 person picks B, the 2 people get 3/2 = 1.5 each and the third person gets 1 for himself.

In a zero-sum setting, if the prizes are (3,1), it would always be best to pick the first location, since you are guaranteed a prize of at least 1. If prizes are (2,1), this is also true, since no other player can beat that strategy. But, if prizes are (3,2), and two players use the strategy, the third player can do better by always picking the 2nd prize.

Is it possible to find an equilibrium for this particular problem, and does it generalize to further players and prizes? Does it fit into some standard theory?