Let me add to the existing answers a point which may seem "vulgar" at first, but I think is actually important:

## V=L is complicated.

And whether or not this *ought* to be a reason to not raise it to ZFC-esque status - I think it is, and see below - I think it's clear that it is *in practice* going to be an issue with any such attempt *(and V=L isn't alone in this ...)*.

The ZFC axioms may be difficult to work with, but they're ultimately not that hard to understand. Union, Powerset, Pairing, and Extensionality are obvious; Separation is just restricted comprehension; Replacement is "transfinite recursion," which isn't really that alien; and Choice both has "obvious enough" forms and is sufficiently famous that general mathematicians are at least familiar with it in the abstract. Foundation poses a bit of an issue, but not because it's *complicated*, but rather because it often seems *pointless*; and that's fine since it really plays no essential role in general mathematics since we can "implement" everything within the hereditarily well-founded sets.

V=L, by contrast, is genuinely complicated. The slogan "only things you can construct exist" is snappy enough, but hides a *ton* of subtlety and is easy to use incorrectly: for example, can you construct the sets required for the Banach-Tarski paradox? *(I've actually seen it claimed, by a competent non-set-theorist, that V=L prevents Banach-Tarski - by virtue of implying that every set of reals is Borel.)*

And there are even deeper issues. For one thing, it's not even clear that V=L is actually first-order expressible! Similarly, the *manner in which* it resolves concrete questions actually requires some direct handling of logic. It takes a very little time to get a basic competency with ZFC; it takes some serious effort to achieve the same for V=L.

This winds up pushing back against "common readability" - the idea that mathematicians should be generally able to read a paper in their own field without having to be competent in an unrelated field. Of course even ignoring logic this frequently fails, but giving V=L the same status as the ZFC axioms would essentially endorse its *fairly global* failure.

In a bit more detail:

At the end of the day this gets to a question about what the purpose of foundations of mathematics is. I take a very "profane" approach: **the point is to facilitate mathematics**. Adding axioms in order to solve questions is fundamentally a cheat, especially when those candidate axioms are fundamentally technical.

I think that in order to be a good candidate axiom, a principle needs to be motivated by *non-foundational* ideas; and this requires more than just demonstrating its power outside of logic.

Of course one can argue about the extent to which the original ZFC axioms satisfy this point, and in my opinion it would be incredibly dishonest to pretend that ZFC is the "a priori correct" foundational theory rather than historically contingent, but *going forwards* I think that the above is important. **I see no way in which V=L meets this criterion**.

Note that this criterion *also* pushes against (large) large cardinals, forcing axioms, etc. And indeed I take the "profane" view of foundations to what I believe is a rather unpopular extreme:

I think that even if we go full Platonist, and even if we're fully convinced after deep technical work that a given principle is true of the universe of sets, that's not enough to add it as an axiom to ZFC.

(I'm not claiming this matches the actual history of ZFC at all, by the way!)