I have asked this question in Mathematics StackExchange, but there is no response yet. I've just realized that here is the right forum for asking research level questions... :'(

In game theory, in the attempt to define sequential equilibrium, for every tuple $b$ of behavioral strategies for each player, the corresponding *belief system induced by $b$* is defined. A tuple $(b,μ)$ is called an *assessment* if $μ$ is the belief system induced by $b$.

Then, the criterion of an assessment being *sequentially rational* is defined.

Finally, *sequential equilibrium* is defined as an assessment $(b,μ)$ such that:

- $(b,μ)$ is sequentially rational.
- There exists a sequence of assessments $(b_i,μ_i)$ such that each $b_i$ assigns nonzero probabilities to all decisions and the sequence converges to $(b,μ)$.

My question is: can there be a sequence of assessments $(b_i,μ_i)$ satisfying condition number 2 and converging to a sequential equilibrium but with each element being not sequentially rational?

Just in case the answer is YES, what if it is given that: *each* sequence of assessments satisfying condition number 2 -- and converging to an assessment $(b,μ)$ -- has $(b_i,μ_i)$ being not sequentially rational for all *large enough* $i$? Can then it be concluded that $(b,μ)$ is not sequentially rational?

I have a strong intuition that the answer to the second question must be YES, because if it isn't, then the definition of sequential equilibrium seems pointless.