Standard model of  ZFC Is  ZFC+Con(ZFC)  powerful enough to show there isn't  any standard model of  ZFC? What you think about it?
 A: Many set theorists define that a model $\langle M,E\rangle$ of set
theory is standard to mean that the set membership relation $E$
of the model is the actual set membership relation $\in$,
restricted to objects in $M$.
The existence of such a standard model of ZFC is equivalent to the
existence of a well-founded model of ZFC, since every well-founded
model is isomorphic to its transitive collapse, via the Mostowski
collapse. The hypothesis that there is such a transitive model of
ZFC should be considered a very weak large cardinal axiom. For
example, the transitive model of ZFC hypothesis appears near the bottom of the
large cardinal hierarchy in Cantor's Attic.
In particular, nearly all the usual large cardinal axioms imply
the existence of a standard model of ZFC, and so very few set
theorists want or expect ZFC to rule them out. Since we think that
large cardinals are consistent with ZFC, we also expect that it is
consistent with ZFC that there are standard models of ZFC. 
For example, if $\kappa$ is an inaccessible cardinal, then the set $H_\kappa$ of all sets having hereditary size less than $\kappa$ forms a transitive model of ZFC. Under the Grothendieck Universe Axiom, there will be a proper class of such inaccessible cardinals, and so the entire set-theoretic universe will be the union of such standard set models of ZFC.
Indeed, I would say much more: it is a fundamental part of the
reflection paradigm, the view that truths in the whole
set-theoretic universe are increasingly found in proper initial
segments of it, that we should expect many initial segments of the
universe to be ZFC models, and these will be standard models. This
is the kind of philosophical justification that one often hears
for various large cardinal hypotheses.
Meanwhile, it is easy to see that if ZFC is consistent, then it is consistent with ZFC that there is no standard model of ZFC. To prove this, take any model of ZFC. If it has no transitive models of ZFC, then we're done. If it does have a transitive model, then it will have an $\in$-minimal transitive model of ZFC, and this will be a model of ZFC having no transitive models of ZFC.
Furthermore, since every transitive model of ZFC has exactly the same arithmetic truths as the ambient universe, it follows that if there is a transitive model of ZFC, then there is one having no transitive model of ZFC, in which Con(ZFC) still holds.  In particular, ZFC+Con(ZFC), if consistent, cannot prove the existence of a standard model of ZFC. One may iterate this to the consistency hierarchy of models of ZFC. Basically, no amount of iterating the Con operator will get you to the existence of a standard model of ZFC, and this seems relevant for your revised question.
Finally, let me point out that if ZFC is inconsistent, then of course it is strong
enough to prove any assertion, including the one you ask about,
and so we cannot say for sure that ZFC doesn't prove your 
assertion without going beyond ZFC in our axioms.
A: Joel has explained that the existence of standard models and a negative answer to the question follow from large cardinal axioms.  He also mentioned, in the context of philosophical justification for large cardinal axioms, "the reflection paradigm, the view that truths in the whole set-theoretic universe are increasingly found in proper initial segments of it".  Let me add that the existence of standard models follows from (ZFC plus) mere acceptance (in an appropriate sense) of the very notion of "truths in the whole set-theoretic universe".  More precisely, suppose we add to the language of ZFC an additional predicate symbol Sat, intended to denote satisfaction, in the whole universe, of formulas of the original language of ZFC.  Suppose we add to the ZFC axioms the clauses that specify Sat by induction on formulas.  And suppose we also extend the axiom scheme of replacement by allowing formulas of the enlarged language.  Then, by formalizing a downward Löwenheim-Skolem argument, we can prove that ZFC has standard models, in fact ones of the form $V_\kappa$.  (We actually get more, namely $V_\kappa$'s that are elementary submodels of the universe, with respect to the original language of ZFC.)  In other words, for the limited sort of "truths in the whole set-theoretic universe" needed in proving the existence of standard models of ZFC, the reflection principle mentioned by Joel becomes provable, once one incorporates the relevant notion of truth into the theory.
