In Enderton's "Mathematical Introduction to Logic" (2ed p.88), $\Gamma\models\phi$ is defined to mean that for every model $M$ and every assignment $s$ such that $M\models\Gamma[s]$, $M\models \phi[s]$.
By contrast, in Bilaniuk's "Problem Course in Mathematical Logic" definition 6.6 on p.38, $\Gamma\models\phi$ is defined to mean that for every model $M$ such that $M\models\Gamma$, $M\models\phi$. Here, $M\models \Gamma$ means $M\models \gamma[s]$ for every assignment $s$ and every $\gamma\in\Gamma$, similarly for $M\models \phi$.
$\Gamma\models\phi$ in symbols:
- Enderton: $\forall M \forall s (M\models \Gamma[s]\rightarrow M\models\phi[s])$
- Bilaniuk: $\forall M ((\forall s M\models \Gamma[s])\rightarrow (\forall s M\models\phi[s]))$
According to the former, $\lbrace x=y\rbrace\not\models\forall x\forall y (x=y)$. According to the latter, $\lbrace x=y\rbrace\models\forall x\forall y(x=y)$.
What do the logicians here at Math Overflow think about this conundrum?
$\forall x\forall y\,x=y$
is provable by itself without any assumptions. $\endgroup$$\forall x\forall y\,x=y$
is not provable,$\forall x\,x=x$
is.) $\endgroup$