Timeline for Is there a general setting for self-reference?
Current License: CC BY-SA 2.5
4 events
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| Sep 22, 2010 at 16:18 | comment | added | dfranke | I think that before I can make a more rigorous proposal about what a self-referential statement is, we first need to set boundaries on what qualifies as a statement. If we need to take into account such sentences as "colorless green ideas sleep furiously", then I wouldn't know where to begin. | |
| Sep 22, 2010 at 16:11 | comment | added | Peter Arndt | I don't quite like the dependence on a Gödelization, but maybe there is no other way. Maybe there is always a choice of Gödelization that renders a given statement self-referential... | |
| Sep 22, 2010 at 16:11 | comment | added | Peter Arndt | Hm, could you clarify that? So, to make sense of proof-theoretic ordinals I need a language in which I can talk about some fragment of arithmetic. So maybe your proposal is to say a statement in a formal language is selfreferential if under some/any translation (to be defined, maybe via a Gödelization?) into the language of arithmetic it becomes self-referential (this depends on a Gödelization of the language of Arithmetic)? | |
| Sep 22, 2010 at 15:50 | history | answered | dfranke | CC BY-SA 2.5 |