Skip to main content
16 events
when toggle format what by license comment
Aug 6, 2014 at 5:19 comment added Sandro Thanks! Turns out that basically all I needed was the Lebesgue Vitali theorem that provides the right generalization of the dominated convergence theorem, so I can get from the a.s.-convergence, which quite obviously holds, to convergence in expectation. In any case, thanks a lot for your help!
Aug 5, 2014 at 17:51 comment added Douglas Zare and you only have slightly more information at $T'$. So, for example, if you choose at time $1.01$ the particle that was greatest at time $1.00$, this will rarely lead to a significantly different outcome. In case you choose a different particle, use coupling to switch the motions.
Aug 5, 2014 at 17:48 comment added Douglas Zare @Sandro: Lipschitz continuity should fail when the times are close to $0$, but other than that I think it should work, though I haven't written out the details. One idea is to compare $x$ at one set of times with $x$ at another set in which all of the times are a little later (not just close). If these have to be close, then you can compare $x$ at close points by comparing each with the coordinatewise maximum. Next, to compare $x$ at a point $T$ with $x$ at a point $T'$ with all times slightly greater, note that at $T'$ you can use the strategy of optimizing wrt what you knew at $T$,
Aug 5, 2014 at 9:05 comment added Sandro Would you mind outlining the proof you have in mind a bit more? What do you use the coupling for? To estimate the distance to the limit for each $n$? How does the coupling imply Lipschitz continuity? Thanks a lot!
Aug 4, 2014 at 20:21 comment added Douglas Zare @Sandro: I think a similar coupling argument works, showing not just continuity but Lipschitz continuity.
Aug 4, 2014 at 18:30 comment added Sandro I just noted a mistake in my proof that $x_j(t_j;t_1, …, t_{j-1})$ is jointly continuous in all arguments. I think what I'm missing might be a standard argument. I take a sequence $(s_1^n, …, s_j^n)$ that converges to $(t_1, …, t_j)$, and try to show that $x_j(s_1^n, …, s_j^n) - x_j(t_1, …, t_j)$ converges to 0. So I condition the expectation on the left on $q(t_1), … , q(t_j)$ (law of it. exp.). By continuity of the Brownian paths, I then get pointwise convergence. However, I'm lacking a dominating function, so I can't apply Lebesgue's theorem. Any ideas for a workaround? Thanks!
Jul 23, 2014 at 0:20 vote accept Sandro
Jul 22, 2014 at 23:35 comment added Douglas Zare @Sandro: I'm happy to have helped. Yes, this is my real name.
Jul 22, 2014 at 22:53 comment added Sandro Wow, I finally got it!:) Thanks! Douglas Zare is your real name? Then I can appropriately credit you in a footnote. (My Advisor, Al Roth, thinks the paper will be published well.)
Jul 20, 2014 at 9:52 comment added Douglas Zare @Sandro: Continue all Brownian motions with one (inductively, some subset) translated. If you translate one BM up by removing a lower BM instead of the highest, then all of your choices at the next removal point are translations of the possibilities if you had removed the highest.
Jul 19, 2014 at 19:22 comment added Sandro Could you say which BMs you couple, and what coupling you choose?
Jul 19, 2014 at 9:12 comment added Douglas Zare @Sandro: No, I don't use $i$ and $j$ interchangeably. $i$ is an index of an opponent's choice.
Jul 19, 2014 at 7:59 comment added Sandro You use $i$ and $j$ interchangeably, right? I guess the stumbling block is the coupling (of I know the definition, but don't have experience with). Also, I'm not sure whether $j=n$ is w.l.o.g. (but that might be because I don't yet quite understand your proof.) If $j=n$ then any gain to the adversary is a loss to player $j$. If $j<n$, then a gain to the adversary can also be due to him picking the player who will be ranked second-to-worst rather than worst at $t_j$, which will not decrease player $j$'s payoff.
Jul 19, 2014 at 6:26 comment added Douglas Zare @Sandro: I assumed $j=n$ because later players don't affect player $j$ so we might as well assume player $j$ is the last player. What don't you understand about the first two lines of my answer?
Jul 19, 2014 at 6:07 comment added Sandro Thanks a lot! However, either I misunderstand your reply, or you misunderstood my question. I'm interested the payoff to player $j$ holding fixed $t_j$, but varying $t_1, …, t_{j-1}$. (I'm only interested in the case $t_1\leq…\leq t_j$.) In case I misunderstood your reply, then it's probably the first two lines.
Jul 19, 2014 at 5:07 history answered Douglas Zare CC BY-SA 3.0