Timeline for Why was John Nash's 1950 Game Theory paper such a big deal?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Apr 16, 2014 at 1:13 | comment | added | Will Sawin | It's not too hard to see that if you know how to generalize to additional players, you also know how to generalize to non-zero-sum. Simply add an additional player with one strategy whose payoff is minus the sum of the other player's payoffs. | |
| Apr 9, 2014 at 18:52 | vote | accept | TSGM | ||
| Apr 9, 2014 at 3:09 | vote | accept | TSGM | ||
| Apr 9, 2014 at 18:52 | |||||
| Apr 8, 2014 at 23:49 | comment | added | GH from MO | @R Hahn: I agree with you. In Nash's paper, the payoff function of each player is an arbitrary linear function on the convex polytope representing the mixed strategies. | |
| Apr 8, 2014 at 22:10 | comment | added | R Hahn | In the comments to the OP Paul Siegel suggests that Nash's notion also extended the earlier results from the zero-sum case to the non-zero-sum case. It is ambiguous from the abstract, where Nash writes "This notion yields a generalization of the concept of the solution of a two-person zero-sum game." As your answer stresses the $n >2$ generalization I just wanted to remark that it may also generalize earlier results in that Nash's notion of equilibrium does not depend on the game being zero-sum. I trust someone will correct me if I have this wrong. | |
| Apr 8, 2014 at 21:39 | history | answered | GH from MO | CC BY-SA 3.0 |