Timeline for Securing privacy of "who communicates with whom" under Orwell-like conditions
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
10 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 30, 2014 at 13:42 | comment | added | Vadym Fedyukovych | D. Chaum - Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms; 1981 | |
| Dec 30, 2014 at 13:22 | comment | added | Vadym Fedyukovych | With all due respect, the scheme described looks like Chaum' mix-net mentioned already (and studied in details). Regarding timing: remailers collect incoming e-mail messages, process and send out the whole bunch on regular intervals. Each step makes it harder (larger number of cases) to correlate input-output based on timing. | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 23:46 | comment | added | Michael | @StefanKohl: what you describe is possible (using UDP/IP protocol instead of TCP/IP), but infeasible: every Alice would have to specify too many fake recipients to hide her Bob and the entire IP infrastructure would screech to a halt. | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 23:16 | comment | added | fedja | "secret service can view all transmitted messages and how they are routed, but has no access to anyone's private computer, since otherwise privacy clearly cannot be guaranteed." In this case everything depends on what the people are allowed to put in their computers before the government starts watching. | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 22:13 | comment | added | Stefan Kohl♦ | Why do the nodes need to know that they are transmitting something to B? -- I think it is at least conceivable that this information is encoded by A into the data in some way such that, although the nodes cannot decipher the destination address or track the data within all the other data in the network, some mathematical process ensures that the data is shipped to B. I don't know whether this is feasible, but simply claiming that it is not is not a good answer. | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 22:06 | comment | added | Michael | @StefanKohl: the nodes need to know that they are transmitting something to B. They may not be aware of the primary origin of the message, only the immediate origin needs to be known. As described in my answer, the primary origin could be hidden by bouncing off offshore nodes; as you described in the comment the primary origin can be hidden in the pool of other messages. As long as there is an intermediate node - either overseas or in your big pool server - you can mask true origin A. Until, that is, Big Brother makes a deal with Moscow or issues a warrant for you big pool server. | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 21:53 | comment | added | Stefan Kohl♦ | Imagine e.g. a protocol where, when A sends a message to B, A encodes the message and merges (think of a mathematical process, not just kind of concatenation!) it with a big pool of other data with other sources and destinations, in such a way that some mathematical process ensures that the nodes transport it to B without knowing that they are doing so, and in such way that the way the message takes cannot be traced within all the lots of other data it is merged into. I don't know whether this is feasible or not -- but problems like this are what I think a good answer should address. | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 21:29 | comment | added | Stefan Kohl♦ | Your model with addressed single data packages travelling through the network from a sender to a recipient is just the most obvious possibility, and what is actually used in the internet. -- Other protocols are conceivable -- though, if feasible, admittedly conceptually more difficult. | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 20:04 | comment | added | Yoav Kallus | Shouldn't your Muscovites be called Cyril and Dimitry? | |
| Oct 29, 2013 at 19:01 | history | answered | Michael | CC BY-SA 3.0 |