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edited Jul 21 2010 at 15:29
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We have numerous statements that are invariant by set
forcing, but which are independent of ZFC and even of ZFC +
large cardinals. Thus, I dispute the premise of your question.
Examples include:
Eventual GCH. This is the assertion that the GCH holds
for all sufficiently large cardinals. This is forcing
invariant, by set forcing (see remarks below), since any
given forcing notion can affect the continuum function
only for cardinals of size less than the size of the
forcing. But it is independent of ZFC, since it is implied
by GCH and it is easy to use class forcing to produce
models with unbounded violations of GCH.
Eventual non-GCH, or eventual some-other-GCH-pattern.
Similarly, we can arrange other GCH patterns just as easily,
and as long as the statement is only that
the pattern holds eventually, then it will again be independent
of ZFC for the same reason.
The previous examples are also independent of ZFC+ large
cardinals, since we can control the GCH pattern while
preserving most of the standard large cardinal notions.
Any kind of eventual statement, about a feature that can
be controlled locally by forcing. For example, assertions about the
eventual pattern of the existence
of $\kappa$-Souslin trees or $\Diamond_\kappa^*$
and so on. These can be controlled by forcing in a class
iteration to achieve unbounded patterns, but set forcing
can only affect things locally. So the statement that the
eventual pattern is such-and-such will be invariant by
set-forcing.
Assertions that there are a proper class of
such-and-such large cardinals. These are forcing invariant,
because by the Levy-Solovay theorem, the large cardinals above the size of any
forcing will be preserved. Thus, the assertion that there
is a proper class of inaccessible cardinals, or Woodin
cardinals or supercompact cardinals, etc. are all forcing
invariant, but we cannot hope to settle these assertions
in ZFC, or even with ZFC + very strong large cardinal axioms not of this particular form.
For example, it is consistent (from a suitable hypothesis) with a supercompact
cardinal (or any other standard large cardinal notion) that there is not a proper class of inaccessible
cardinals. It is consistent with an almost huge cardinal that there is a proper class of supercomapct cardinals, and also that there is not (assuming a suitable LC hypothesis).
The failure of the Ground Axiom. The Ground Axiom, which I introduced with Jonas
Reitz, is the assertion that the universe is
not a set-forcing extension of any inner model. Despite
its second-order nature, it is actually first-order
expressible. GA is true in L and forceable over
any model of ZFC by class forcing, but once it fails, then
of course it remains false in any set forcing extension.
So $\neg GA$ is upwards forcing invariant by set forcing.
And again, we get the independence here not just over ZFC,
but over ZFC + large cardinals.
There are other similar examples concerning the
existence of bedrock models, that is, ground models of
the universe that are not themselves forcing extensions of
any inner model.
All of these statements are forcing-invariant in the sense you mention, but none of them are settled either way by large cardinal axioms.
Set forcing vs. class forcing. It is important in
your example and all my examples above that we are speaking
of forcing invariance by set forcing, that is, when the
partial order is a set, rather than a proper class. Your
example theorem, for example, is true for set forcing,
but not for class forcing. In particular, the statement
that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals is itself
destroyable by class forcing: one can perform the
coding-the-universe forcing that obtains $V[G]=L[x]$ for a
real $x$, and there are no Woodin cardinals in $L[x]$.
So you are only talking about forcing invariance for set
forcing to begin with. Furthermore, the assertion that
"$\varphi$ is set forcing invariant" is first-order
expressible for set forcing, but not for class forcing.
Thus, it is difficult to formalize or even express any
general theory about forcing invariance by class forcing,
although one can adopt ad hoc methods for particular
statements.
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edited Jul 21 2010 at 15:14
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We have numerous statements that are invariant by set
forcing, but which are independent of ZFC and even of ZFC +
large cardinals. Thus, I dispute the premise of your question.
Examples include:
Eventual GCH. This is the assertion that the GCH holds
for all sufficiently large cardinals. This is forcing
invariant, by set forcing (see remarks below), since any
given forcing notion can affect the continuum function
only for cardinals of size less than the size of the
forcing. But it is independent of ZFC, since it is implied
by GCH and it is easy to use class forcing to produce
models with unbounded violations of GCH.
Eventual non-GCH, or eventual some-other-GCH-pattern.
Similarly, we can arrange other GCH patterns just as easily,
and as long as the statement is only that
the pattern holds eventually, then it will again be independent
of ZFC for the same reason.
The previous examples are also independent of ZFC+ large
cardinals, since we can control the GCH pattern while
preserving most of the standard large cardinal notions.
Any kind of eventual statement, about a feature that can
be controlled locally by forcing. For example, assertions about the
eventual pattern of the existence
of $\kappa$-Souslin trees or $\Diamond_\kappa^*$
and so on. These can be controlled by forcing in a class
iteration to achieve unbounded patterns, but set forcing
can only affect things locally. So the statement that the
eventual pattern is such-and-such will be invariant by
set-forcing.
Assertions that there are a proper class of
such-and-such large cardinals. These are forcing invariant,
because by the Levy-Solovay theorem, the large cardinals above the size of any
forcing will be preserved. Thus, the assertion that there
is a proper class of inaccessible cardinals, or Woodin
cardinals or supercompact cardinals, etc. are all forcing
invariant, but we cannot hope to settle these assertions
in ZFC, or even with ZFC + very strong large cardinal axioms not of this particular form.
For example, it is consistent (from a suitable hypothesis) with a supercompact
cardinal (or any other standard large cardinal notion) that there is not a proper class of inaccessible
cardinals. It is consistent with an almost huge cardinal that there is a proper class of supercomapct cardinals, and also that there is not (assuming a suitable LC hypothesis).
The failure of the Ground Axiom. The Ground Axiom, which I introduced with Jonas
Reitz, is the assertion that the universe is
not a set-forcing extension of any inner model. Despite
its second-order nature, it is actually first-order
expressible. GA is true in L and forceable over
any model of ZFC by class forcing, but once it fails, then
of course it remains false in any set forcing extension.
So $\neg GA$ is upwards forcing invariant by set forcing.
And again, we get the independence here not just over ZFC,
but over ZFC + large cardinals.
There are other similar examples concerning the
existence of bedrock models, that is, ground models of
the universe that are not themselves forcing extensions of
any inner model.
Set forcing vs. class forcing. It is important in
your example and all my examples above that we are speaking
of forcing invariance by set forcing, that is, when the
partial order is a set, rather than a proper class. Your
example theorem, for example, is true for set forcing,
but not for class forcing. In particular, the statement
that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals is itself
destroyable by class forcing: one can perform the
coding-the-universe forcing that obtains $V[G]=L[x]$ for a
real $x$, and there are no Woodin cardinals in $L[x]$.
So you are only talking about forcing invariance for set
forcing to begin with. Furthermore, the assertion that
"$\varphi$ is set forcing invariant" is first-order
expressible for set forcing, but not for class forcing.
Thus, it is difficult to formalize or even express any
general theory about forcing invariance by class forcing,
although one can adopt ad hoc methods for particular
statements.
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answered Jul 21 2010 at 15:02
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We have numerous statements that are invariant by set
forcing, but which are independent of ZFC and even of ZFC +
large cardinals. Examples include:
Eventual GCH. This is the assertion that the GCH holds
for all sufficiently large cardinals. This is forcing
invariant, by set forcing (see remarks below), since any
given forcing notion can affect the continuum function
only for cardinals of size less than the size of the
forcing. But it is independent of ZFC, since it is implied
by GCH and it is easy to use class forcing to produce
models with unbounded violations of GCH.
Eventual non-GCH, or eventual some-other-GCH-pattern.
Similarly, we can arrange other GCH patterns just as easily,
and as long as the statement is only that
the pattern holds eventually, then it will again be independent
of ZFC for the same reason.
The previous examples are also independent of ZFC+ large
cardinals, since we can control the GCH pattern while
preserving most of the standard large cardinal notions.
Any kind of eventual statement, about a feature that can
be controlled locally by forcing. For example, assertions about the
eventual pattern of the existence
of $\kappa$-Souslin trees or $\Diamond_\kappa^*$
and so on. These can be controlled by forcing in a class
iteration to achieve unbounded patterns, but set forcing
can only affect things locally. So the statement that the
eventual pattern is such-and-such will be invariant by
set-forcing.
Assertions that there are a proper class of
such-and-such large cardinals. These are forcing invariant,
because by the Levy-Solovay theorem, the large cardinals above the size of any
forcing will be preserved. Thus, the assertion that there
is a proper class of inaccessible cardinals, or Woodin
cardinals or supercompact cardinals, etc. are all forcing
invariant, but we cannot hope to settle these assertions
in ZFC, or even with ZFC + very strong large cardinal axioms not of this particular form.
For example, it is consistent (from a suitable hypothesis) with a supercompact
cardinal (or any other standard large cardinal notion) that there is not a proper class of inaccessible
cardinals. It is consistent with an almost huge cardinal that there is a proper class of supercomapct cardinals, and also that there is not (assuming a suitable LC hypothesis).
The failure of the Ground Axiom. The Ground Axiom, which I introduced with Jonas
Reitz, is the assertion that the universe is
not a set-forcing extension of any inner model. Despite
its second-order nature, it is actually first-order
expressible. GA is true in L and forceable over
any model of ZFC by class forcing, but once it fails, then
of course it remains false in any set forcing extension.
So $\neg GA$ is upwards forcing invariant by set forcing.
And again, we get the independence here not just over ZFC,
but over ZFC + large cardinals.
There are other similar examples concerning the
existence of bedrock models, that is, ground models of
the universe that are not themselves forcing extensions of
any inner model.
Set forcing vs. class forcing. It is important in
your example and all my examples above that we are speaking
of forcing invariance by set forcing, that is, when the
partial order is a set, rather than a proper class. Your
example theorem, for example, is true for set forcing,
but not for class forcing. In particular, the statement
that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals is itself
destroyable by class forcing: one can perform the
coding-the-universe forcing that obtains $V[G]=L[x]$ for a
real $x$, and there are no Woodin cardinals in $L[x]$.
So you are only talking about forcing invariance for set
forcing to begin with. Furthermore, the assertion that
"$\varphi$ is set forcing invariant" is first-order
expressible for set forcing, but not for class forcing.
Thus, it is difficult to formalize or even express any
general theory about forcing invariance by class forcing,
although one can adopt ad hoc methods for particular
statements.
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