There are collections too big to be a set, e.g. the collection of all sets (in ZFC), and there are collections that cannot be sets for "pure" logical reasons, e.g. the collection of sets that do not contain themselves.
There are functions growing too fast to be computable, e.g. the busy beaver function, and there are functions that cannot be computed for "pure" logical reasons, e.g. the halting function.
In the final end it is of course shown by logical means that being too big (growing too fast) prohibit a collection to be a set (a function to be computable), but those properties are not "purely" logical (they are about sizes and growth rates), opposed to the "pure" logical reasons mentioned above.
Is there a simple lesson to be learned from these observations? Are there other not "purely" logical properties of collections (functions) that prohibit them to be sets (computable)?
Edit: It's from the very definition of a collection -- $\lbrace x | x = x \rbrace$ or $\lbrace x | x \not\in x \rbrace$ -- that it is shown by logical means, that it cannot be a set. And not, firstly, from a hard to define meta-property of "defining too big a collection" or "being intrinsically inconsistent".
Then it's at least somehow astonishing, that some of those definitions cohere with the meta-property of "defining too big a collection".
Cannot - after all - the meta-property of "defining too big a collection" be rigorously defined such that for every it can be shown that no definition of a collection with this meta-property it can be shown, that it doesn't define defines a set?
(The same should go - mutatis mutandis - for functions and computability.)