5
votes
2answers
782 views

Why can't mathematics be formalised in terms of classes rather than sets? [closed]

I've always been curious about the seeming compulsion to found mathematics upon sets, be it ZF(C) or some other system. Of course, there are other approaches these days like category theory and type ...
8
votes
3answers
595 views

What set theoretical questions could never be answered by Turing machines of arbitrary cardinality?

Let us assume that there are Turing machines of arbitrary cardinality, by that I mean they can have input tapes of any arbitrarily high cardinality and compute for a number of steps also of ...
8
votes
3answers
573 views

Consistency of Analysis (second order arithmetic)

Is there a proof of the consistency of Analysis (second order arithmetic), which is similar to Gentzen's proof of the consistency of arithmetic? Update: Which (different) methods can be used to ...
4
votes
1answer
311 views

Why is adopting Russell's Axiom of Reducibility as strong as eliminating the Ramified Hierarchy?

In order to respond to concerns of impredicativity, Bertrand Russell developed a system of ramified second-order logic, which is like regular second-order logic except the comprehension schema is ...
0
votes
0answers
104 views

What references cover finitary systems of Ramified Analysis with transfinite levels?

The ramified theory of types, invented by Bertrand Russell, is a way of dealing with impredicativity by breaking the comprehension schema of second-order logic into levels. The comprehension schema ...
1
vote
0answers
241 views

What is the role of the (formalized) omega rule in Ramified Analysis?

In the 1960's, Feferman and Schutte did groundbreaking proof-theoretic work to find out the strength of predicative systems of second-order arithmetic. They used the ramified theory of types, a ...
3
votes
2answers
240 views

What is the proof-theoretic ordinal of Hyperarithmetical Comprehension?

As I discuss in my answer here, it seems to me that Solomon Feferman shows, on pages 10-11 of his seminal 1964 paper "Systems of Predicative Analysis", that if you consider predicative second-order ...
1
vote
0answers
153 views

Has the Ramified Theory of Types been applied to Predicative Set Theories?

Questions of predicativity are well-studied in the context of arithmetic. We have a base theory, first-order Peano arithmetic. Some people, like Edward Nelson (in chapter 1 of his book) and Charles ...
4
votes
2answers
361 views

Did Gödel prove that the Ramified Theory of Types collapses at $\omega_1$?

Second-Order Arithmetic is considered impredicative, because the comprehension scheme allows formulas with bound second-order variables that range over all sets of natural numbers, including the set ...
4
votes
1answer
224 views

Can the Burgess-Hazen analysis of Predicative Arithmetic be extended to Transfinite Types?

Around page 300 of his book "Mathematical Thought and its Objects", Charles Parsons discusses the work of Edward Nelson, who believes that mathematical induction is impredicative, because it can be ...
5
votes
1answer
421 views

Original proof of Gödel's completeness theorem compared to Henkin's proof

May I have some clarification about original proof of Gödel's Completeness Theorem compared to "standard" Henkin's proof based on Model Existence Lemma ? My understanding of Gödel's original proof is ...
10
votes
2answers
415 views

Ways to define “definability”

The notion of a definable set is not expressible in the language of set theory: there is no formula $\delta(x)$ that is equivalent with there being a formula $\phi(y)$ such that $x = \lbrace y : ...
4
votes
2answers
251 views

On wild behavior of $\omega_{1}$ in the absence of some essential axioms of $ZFC$

The regularity of $\omega_{1}$ is one of the most well known facts of set theory. But it seems that in order to prove this simple fact we need the "full power" of mathematics! For example by an ...
1
vote
0answers
150 views

Is there a non-trivial consistency preserving transformation?

In ‎set ‎theory ‎"equiconsistency" (and not "consistency") ‎of ‎the ‎theories ‎is the‎ ‎main ‎part ‎of ‎researches. ‎So ‎we ‎usually ‎try ‎to ‎construct a‎ ‎new model ‎using a‎ ‎given ‎one. ‎In ‎the ...
12
votes
3answers
734 views

Where is the end of universe?

In some sense the empty set ($\emptyset$) and the global set of all sets ($G$) are the ends of the universe of mathematical objects. The world which $ZFC$ describes has an end from the bottom and is ...
2
votes
0answers
358 views

Is there a notion of “predicative given the real numbers”?

A definition is called impredicative if it involves quantification over a domain that contains the thing being defined. For instance, if you define hereditary property to be a property which applies ...
4
votes
2answers
264 views

Does the Feferman-Schutte analysis give a precise characterization of Predicative Second-Order Arithmetic?

A definition is called impredicative if it involves quantification over a domain that contains the thing being defined. For instance, if you define hereditary property to be a property which applies ...
22
votes
4answers
1k views

Illustrating Edward Nelson's Worldview with Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic

Mathematician Edward Nelson is known for his extreme views on the foundations of mathematics, variously described as "ultrafintism" or "strict finitism" (Nelson's preferred term), which came into the ...
7
votes
0answers
424 views

Has anyone pursued Frege's idea of numbers as second-order concepts?

Gottlob Frege was a pivotal figure in the history of mathematical logic. He gave an analysis of numbers that proceeded along roughly the following lines, in his books "The Foundations of Arithmetic" ...
-2
votes
3answers
466 views

Can different extensions of ZF have contradictory consequences for first-order arithmetic?

My question is basically, does there exist a statement X independent of ZF such that ZF + X implies a statement P of first-order arithmetic, but ZF + not X implies not P? Now X cannot be the axiom ...
9
votes
2answers
461 views

Are simplicial sets the intended model of HoTT?

While thinking about Jason Rute's question, I wondered if there was an intended model for HoTT. The main candidate for the intended model are simplicial sets, where Vladimir Voevodsky first observed ...
14
votes
1answer
516 views

On Joyal's completeness theorem for first order logic

In 1978, in a series of unpublished conferences in Montréal, A. Joyal announced a remarkable theorem that unified several completeness theorems for fragments of first order logic, as well as first ...
8
votes
2answers
715 views

Equivalent form of the Univalence Axiom

I'm reading the new HoTT book and I'm wondering about a potential equivalent form of the Univalence Axiom: $(A \simeq B) \simeq (A = B)$. For simplicity, I'm tacitly working in a fixed universe. It ...
8
votes
3answers
921 views

Is there a categorical proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorem?

A significant result in set theory was shown by Cohen when he showed that the continuum hypothesis was independent of ZFC using a new technique called forcing. In Topos theory, this result has a new ...
5
votes
1answer
447 views

What can be done with computability logic that previous logic systems can't?

I've been reading a lot about computability logic lately and I'm superficially aware that it unifies classical, intuitionistic and linear logics. What I'm seeking to know is: Can computability logic ...
7
votes
1answer
420 views

Normality of Chaitin's constant

Can anyone provide an overview of the proof that Chaitin's constant is normal, or better yet, the guiding intuition? Even if we replace the existential quantifiers in the assertion of non-normality ...
17
votes
6answers
1k views

Where in ordinary math do we need unbounded separation and replacement?

[I have updated the question after initial comments in the hope of clarifying it.] I do quite a bit of reasoning, typically about topology and metric spaces, in "non-standard" foundations, such as ...
16
votes
1answer
483 views

Monte Carlo integration

As probably many other people here, I learned integration, as an undergrad, from Rudin's books. I recently realized, however, that I don't quite use Lebesgue integration in my work, or at least I use ...
1
vote
1answer
359 views

Cardinal Arithmetic, foundations and constructive math

This is not my area but a question occurred to me that I can not find the answer to. There is a very strong axiom of constructibility which ironically gives us highly non-constructive math (GCH is one ...
2
votes
1answer
881 views

Are the Foundations of Mathematical Logic Shaky? [closed]

The mathematics community at large seems pretty satisfied right now with the common practice of 1. starting with some axioms and 2. deriving theorems from them by employing some logic. All mathematics ...
1
vote
1answer
217 views

Finite level super classes over ZFC

My question is: "Is it possible to have a sound and rigorous legitimation of the following construction ?". This construction is: 0/ Let ZFC be the usuel set theory, and let us add to the language ...
20
votes
4answers
2k views

Nonstandard analysis in probability theory

I am quite new at nonstandard analysis, and recently I became aware of its use in probability theory mainly through the following two books: Nelson (1987). Radically Elementary Probability Theory ...
3
votes
1answer
349 views

Should functions be assumed to behave like the identity function when evaluated outside their domain?

Suppose we have a set $f$ of ordered pairs (so not a triple $(X,Y,f)$ but just the $f$) and suppose that $f$ has the appropriate property such that we can view $f$ as a function. Formally, we wish to ...
1
vote
4answers
482 views

Why can't an explicit well-ordering of the reals be ruled out in ZF?

The statement A = "There exists a well-ordering of the reals" is independent of ZF. My understanding is that the statement B = "There exists an explicit well-ordering of the reals" is also ...
4
votes
1answer
298 views

weakening naive comprehension to avoid the paradoxes

Weakening the axiom of naive comprehension has not been a popular way of escaping from the set-theoretic paradoxes because no consistent weakenings seem to be particularly well motivated or even to ...
1
vote
1answer
301 views

Tarski-Grothendieck set theory, the axiom of pairing and the axiom of specification

I am building upon MO question 102846 concerning the Tarski-Grothendieck set theory (TG). I have two questions; 1/ I think that it is possible that the axiom of pairing (axiom 4 of the TG theory ...
4
votes
2answers
683 views

Large cardinals without the ambient set theory?

In an attempt to understand a bit better large cardinals, I have been thinking along the following lines, which could be summarized under the slogan Talk about cardinals without the (ambient) ...
7
votes
8answers
2k views

ULTRAINFINITISM, or a step beyond the transfinite

Cantor has, in the immortal words of D. Hilbert, given all of us a paradise (or perhaps, I would rather say, a great vacation spot), the TRANSFINITE. $\aleph_0, \aleph_1,\aleph_2\dots$ the lists ...
15
votes
3answers
784 views

Finite versions of Godel' s incompleteness

Assume you have some notion of proof complexity: for instance, at the basic level, the length of a proof, or the number of symbols used, take your pick (there are more involved measures, but for sake ...
3
votes
1answer
307 views

Godel 's Ladder: Undecidable PI_N sentences for N =2, 3, …

After Godel's groundbreaking results, a plethora of $\Pi_1^0$ undecidable arithmetical sentences have been found by many authors. But what about $\Pi_n^0$ for $n=2,3,.....$ ? There are, to my ...
11
votes
1answer
644 views

Elementary Equivalence =? Homotopy Equivalence

One of the most interesting novelties in recent foundational studies is Voevodsky's Homotopical Type Theory project (see here). Finally homotopy theory ideas have entered in a royal fashion the ...
8
votes
1answer
328 views

Ultimate Maximality Principle

I wonder if it's possible to formulate an "ultimate" maximality principle (UMP) and prove its consistency. I envision UMP to express the idea that no matter how we enlarge the universe of set theory V ...
2
votes
1answer
225 views

comprehension and ideal elements

A not uncommon thought in philosophy is that we should distinguish (in philosophy, anyway) between "sparse" ("real", "serious") and "abundant" ("ideal", "superficial") properties/classes and ...
16
votes
0answers
346 views

Are there lightweight foundations for arbitrarily extendable objects?

My experience with foundations is rather scant, but I've run into some types of objects that seem to resist the sort of set-theoretic encoding schemes via Kurowski tuples that are rather common for ...
5
votes
1answer
509 views

Some questions about Ackermann set theory

In a comment on this site Andreas Blass stated: "To fit this situation into my philosophical point of view, I'd say that what Ackermann's theory calls proper classes are really certain sets. That ...
11
votes
5answers
2k views

getting rid of existential quantifiers

It seems to me that for most of the twentieth century, axiomatic foundations for mathematical theories were constructed with the (mostly allied) goals of minimizing the number of primitive notions and ...
10
votes
1answer
1k views

Up-to-date version of Principia Mathematica?

Background: I found this interesting translation of Godel's On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I that, along with translating it into English, uses more ...
6
votes
0answers
939 views

Is there a finite-dimensional vector space whose dimension cannot be found? [closed]

Is there a finite-dimensional vector space whose dimension cannot be found? Assume, we have somehow constructed a vector space whose dimension is finite, but yet unknown. Is there always an algorithm ...
3
votes
2answers
1k views

Foundations: Existence of uncountable ordinals.

This isn't really a research question, but at least it's research-level mathematics. I'm talking with some other people about the first uncountable ordinal, and I want some facts to inform this ...
6
votes
1answer
858 views

How are mathematical objects defined from an ultrafinitist perspective?

I remember attending a lecture given by an ultrafinitist who denied that curves are a set of points, he would only say that any particular point may or not be on the curve. Similarly for algebraic or ...