# The existence of proper classes

Andreas Blass states that proper classes do not exist and emphasizes that this is only his philosophical opinion, and not a mathematical fact.(link text).

Is it really not a mathematical fact? I think there are some mathematical results that justify his philosophical opinion. Levy and Vaught prove that Ackermann's set theory proves the existence of the classes {V}, P{V}, PP{V},....(Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 11:1045-1062, 1961). Furthermore, Reinhardt proves that Ackermann's set theory equals ZF (Annals of Mathematical Logic, 2:189-249). My understanding of these results is that anything we can prove in Ackermann's set theory, we can prove in ZF as well. There is no need to assume the existence of the classes P{V}, PP{V}, PPP{V},...because there is nothing new math fact to obtain.

Is my understanding correct?

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If I read Andreas correctly, I think he was saying that in his philosophically motivated "model" of mathematics, there are no proper classes. That is not to say there are not other ways of thinking about mathematics, which are consistent, and make use of proper classes. –  Pace Nielsen Feb 9 '12 at 16:32
If I remember correctly, in the context of Ackermann's set theory one does need the proper classes; without them that theory is weaker than ZF. To fit this situation into my philosophical point of view, I'd say that what Ackermann's theory calls proper classes are really certain sets. That notion has some support in the Levy-Vaught interpretation of Ackermann set theory in a conservative extension of ZF, where both the sets and the classes of Ackermann are interpreted as certain sets in the sense of ZF. –  Andreas Blass Feb 9 '12 at 16:58
Even if it is true that everything we prove using proper classes (and not referring explicitly to proper classes) could be proved without using them, that would have no bearing on the question of whether proper classes exist. –  Mike Shulman Mar 31 '12 at 17:19

From a technical point of view, the situation is no more paradoxical than for instance a formal theory of the rational numbers in which it can be proved that there is no square root of 2, but that can be embedded in a larger structure where $\sqrt{2}$ does exist.