Carl, can I ask you one more question concerning the topic?
I thought about the reasons why we cannot prove in PRA totality of the Ackerman function $A(m,n)$, directly using double mathematical induction for $n$ then for $m$, and came to a conclusion, that it's because the deduction theorem is nonapplicable to PRA. Please correct me if the following reasoning is wrong.
First, let us define in the PRA language, using Kleene's T predicate, the predicate $\varphi_A(m,n)$, which means: $\exists k ~ k=A(m,n)$.
Second, using the definition of $A(m,n)$, let us amplify the PRA by the next three axioms:
1) $\varphi_A(0,n)$
2) $\varphi_A(m,1) \to \varphi_A(m+1,0)$
3) $\varphi_A(m,K(m)) \to [\varphi_A(m+1,n) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n+1)]$
The axiom (3) is the result of Skolemization of the next assertion:
$\forall m ~ [\forall k ~ \varphi_A(m,k)] \to [\forall n ~ \varphi_A(m+1,n) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n+1)]$
where $K$ is the new functional symbol.
Third, notice that $\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m))$ implies both $\varphi_A(m+1,0)$ and $\varphi_A(m+1,n) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n+1)$:
4) $[\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m))] \to \varphi_A(m+1,0)$
5) $[\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m))] \to [\varphi_A(m+1,n) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n+1)]$
Here we used deduction theorem, but only in trivial form: $(a \wedge b \vdash c) \to (a \vdash b \to c)$, which is independent of the PRA axioms.
Joining (4) with (5):
6) $[\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m))] \to (\varphi_A(m+1,0) \wedge [\varphi_A(m+1,n) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n+1)])$
Here we can see a premise of mathematical induction for $n$ - in the right part of the implication.
We have not proven assertion $\varphi_A(m+1,0) \wedge [\varphi_A(m+1,n) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n+1)]$ yet. But if we could use deduction theorem in the form: $(PRA \wedge a \vdash b) \to (PRA \vdash a \to b)$, then we could continue the proof.
So, let us suppose, that we can use deduction theorem in the form: $(PRA \wedge a \vdash b) \to (PRA \vdash a \to b)$.
Fourth, let us suppose $\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m))$. It implies $\varphi_A(m+1,0) \wedge [\varphi_A(m+1,n) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n+1)]$, and the last, using mathematical induction for $n$, implies $\varphi_A(m+1,n)$. Thus, by the deduction theorem we have:
7) $\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m)) \to \varphi_A(m+1,n)$
Fifth, using substitution $n$ for $1$ and for $K(m+1)$, we can conclude from $\varphi_A(m+1,n)$ the next: $\varphi_A(m+1,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m+1,K(m+1))$. Thus, using (7), we can conclude the last from $\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m))$. Using deduction theorem again (but only in "trivial" form, which is independent of the PRA axioms), we have:
8) $\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m)) \to \varphi_A(m+1,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m+1,K(m+1))$
Sixth, from (1) we can conclude:
9) $\varphi_A(0,1) \wedge \varphi_A(0,K(0))$
Seventh, from (8) and (9), using mathematical induction for $m$, we can conclude:
10) $\varphi_A(m,1) \wedge \varphi_A(m,K(m))$
Eighth, from (7) and (10) we can conclude:
11) $\varphi_A(m+1,n)$
Jointly with (1) it means $\varphi_A(m,n)$ - assertion about totality of the Ackerman function.
Knowing, that it's undecidable in PRA, I can see only one used assumption, which can be wrong: That we can use deduction theorem in the form: $(PRA \wedge a \vdash b) \to (PRA \vdash a \to b)$.
So we cannot use deduction theorem in this form?