3
$\begingroup$

Consider the following graph game, given a graph $G=(V,E)$ on $n$ vertices with minimum degree $ \gg \log(n)$. Players are BR and MA (BR moves first):

  1. BR claims an unclaimed edge from $E$, adds it to $B$
  2. MA claims an unclaimed edge from $E$, adds to $M$
  3. Repeat

MA wins if for all edges (with corresponding vertices $v$ from $V$) in $M$ fulfills $\deg_M(v) \geq (1-\epsilon)\cdot 1/3 \cdot \deg_G(v)$, for some $\epsilon > 0$.

I would like to show that there exists a winning strategy for MA.

In order to do that I would have to assume BR is playing optimally. I'm guessing I need to figure out what that strategy is before I can start proving $Pr[\exists \text{winning strategy}]>0$. Any ideas?

$\endgroup$
4
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ Could you possibly say something about where this problem comes from and why you expect $1/3$ to be what is achievable for maker? $\endgroup$
    – Ben Barber
    Oct 28, 2014 at 22:57
  • $\begingroup$ Who moves first? This is especially important on K_3. $\endgroup$ Oct 28, 2014 at 23:03
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ I found it in the lecture notes for a course on the subject. It is stated that for 1/3 there exists a winning strategy, but 1/2 is still an open problem. $\endgroup$
    – murv
    Oct 28, 2014 at 23:04
  • $\begingroup$ BR moves first. $\endgroup$
    – murv
    Oct 28, 2014 at 23:05

2 Answers 2

1
$\begingroup$

I would try the following. Every time breaker plays an edge, maker chooses an endpoint of that edge at random and plays any available edge at that vertex. Since the vertex degrees are much bigger than $\log n$, each vertex should be chosen by maker about half the number of times it gets used by breaker, so maker should achieve about $1/3$ of the available degree at each vertex. The times maker is forced to deviate from this strategy because there are no edges available will be swallowed by the $\epsilon$.

Two clarifications following the comments:

Maker's extra degree at other vertices. Treat this like you would the bonus move you get in a strategy stealing argument. We don't count the bonus degree towards our total at any vertex, and if our strategy ever tells us to play at a vertex where we've built up some bonus degree then we spend that and move arbitrarily (building up bonus degree at some two vertices). This handles the problem that arises if our strategy tells us to play at a vertex but we can't because we've already amassed too much bonus degree there.

Why do we need the vertex degrees to be large? In expectation we get to play at each vertex half as often as breaker. To say that this is in fact the typical behaviour we use a Chernoff inequality to say that the probability of differing from the expectation by a factor of more than $\epsilon$ at a vertex $v$ is bounded by an expression like $e^{-\epsilon^2d(v)}$, which tends to zero faster than $1/n$ (which is what we need to take a union bound over all $n$ vertices) provided that $d(v)$ is large enough compared to $\log n$.

$\endgroup$
6
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ Thank you, I must have missed your answer. What is the intuition behind getting about 1/3 of the available degree? I'm thinking since maker gets each vertex half the number of times, and only half of the degree will be available, maker will get about 1/4? $\endgroup$
    – murv
    Oct 31, 2014 at 16:40
  • $\begingroup$ @murv, why should only half of the degree be available at each vertex? If we split a set with $n$ elements and I get half as many as you, I still get $n/3$. $\endgroup$
    – Ben Barber
    Nov 4, 2014 at 8:24
  • $\begingroup$ You're right. I'm having some problems with the overall intuition for this one. Especially since each time maker picks a vertex, he also gets one degree from another, random neighboring vertex. Can you please explain a little bit more why the vertex degree of >> log $n$ is important? $\endgroup$
    – murv
    Nov 4, 2014 at 9:07
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ In expectation, each vertex will be chosen half as often by maker as by breaker. To show that this is what will actually happen, we want to use a concentration result. Chernoff's inequality says that the probability that we are off the expectation by a factor of $\epsilon$ at vertex $v$ is roughly $e^{-\epsilon^2d(v)}$, so we need $d(v) \gg \log n$ to ensure that this tends to zero fast enough to use a union bound over all $n$ vertices. $\endgroup$
    – Ben Barber
    Nov 4, 2014 at 9:41
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ The fact that maker picks up extra degree at other vertices is just a bonus: it doesn't hurt maker at all, so we're not cheating if we ignore it in the analysis. $\endgroup$
    – Ben Barber
    Nov 4, 2014 at 9:51
2
$\begingroup$

This is proved by using a variant of the 'box game' of Chvatal and Erdos. The idea is the following.

As Maker, what you do is pick a 'most dangerous' vertex, meaning one where the ratio of your edges to Breaker's is worst, and you take an arbitrary edge there.

To prove this is a winning strategy is a bit harder. You would like to use a potential function argument, but if you do the naive approach you will get stuck because you are only trying to help yourself in one place whereas Breaker might be hurting you at two different vertices simultaneously. So what you do is take the abstract game where you have a box for each vertex and you claim elements, with Maker's bias one (because the 'other' endpoint cannot hurt Maker) and Breaker's is two (for the two endpoints of Breaker's edge). You prove the above strategy gives a Maker win in this game, which now is a fairly standard potential function argument. See Beck's book, or more recently Gebauer-Szabo or Ferber-Krivelevich-Naves.

This translation to the abstract game is where you lose something and can only guarantee $(1-\varepsilon)/3$ fraction of the vertex degree; the potential function argument is sharp (and it is where the log degree restriction comes in).

$\endgroup$
4
  • $\begingroup$ Thank you for the response. Is it really necessary to actually find the winning strategy? I was thinking we could consider all possible strategies and prove that there is a non-zero probability that one of them is a winner. $\endgroup$
    – murv
    Oct 28, 2014 at 23:26
  • $\begingroup$ No, it's not necessary (though of course it is nicer). The last paper I mentioned does exactly this of considering a randomised strategy (for a different game!) and showing it works with positive probability - then you know there exists a Maker win strategy, since otherwise there would be a Breaker win strategy and then Breaker would play it versus the random strategy to win all the time. $\endgroup$
    – Peter
    Oct 29, 2014 at 6:58
  • $\begingroup$ And do you have any suggestion how I would go about using a randomized strategy for this problem? $\endgroup$
    – murv
    Oct 29, 2014 at 12:30
  • $\begingroup$ No, otherwise I would already be trying it... $\endgroup$
    – Peter
    Oct 31, 2014 at 10:36

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service and acknowledge you have read our privacy policy.

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.